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ABSTRACT
I examine the causes and the consequences of differences in labor market outcomes across local labor
markets within a country. The focus is on a long-run general equilibrium setting, where workers and
firms are free to move across localities and local prices adjust to maintain the spatial equilibrium. In
particular, I develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of local labor markets with heterogenous
labor. This framework is useful in thinking about differences in labor market outcomes of different
skill groups across locations. It clarifies how, in spatial equilibrium, localized shocks to a part of the
labor market propagate to the rest of the economy through changes in employment, wages and local
prices and how this diffusion affects workers' welfare. Using this framework, I address three related
questions. First, I analyze the welfare consequences of productivity differences across local labor markets.
I seek to understand what happens to the wage, employment and utility of workers with different skill
levels when a local economy experiences a shift in the productivity of a group of workers.  Second,
I analyze the causes of productivity differences across local labor markets. To a large extent, productivity
differences within a country are unlikely to be exogenous. I review the theoretical and empirical literature
on agglomeration economies, with a particular focus on studies that are relevant for labor economists.
Finally, I discuss the implications for policy.
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Local labor markets in the US are characterized by enormous diﬀerences in worker
earnings, factor productivity and ﬁrm innovation. The hourly wage of workers located in
metropolitan areas at the top of the wage distribution is more than double the wage of
observationally similar workers located in metropolitan areas at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. These diﬀerences reﬂect, at least in part, variation in local productivity. For example,
total factor productivity of manufacturing establishments in areas at the top of the TFP
distribution is three times larger than total factor productivity in areas at the bottom of the
distribution. The amount of innovation is also spatially uneven. Firms in Santa Clara and
San Jose generate respectively 3390 and 1906 new patents in a typical year, while the median
city generates less than 1 patent per year. Notably, these diﬀerences in wages, productivity
and innovation appear to be largely persistent over the last three decades.
In this chapter, I review what we know about the causes and the consequences of diﬀer-
ences in labor market outcomes across local labor markets within a country. The focus is
on a long-run general equilibrium setting, where workers and ﬁrms are free to move across
localities and local prices adjust to maintain the spatial equilibrium. In particular, I develop
a tractable general equilibrium framework of local labor markets with heterogenous labor.
This framework—which represents the unifying theme of the chapter—is useful in thinking
about diﬀerences in labor market outcomes of diﬀerent skill groups across locations. It clar-
iﬁes how, in spatial equilibrium, localized shocks to a part of the labor market propagate
to the rest of the economy through changes in employment, wages and local prices and how
this diﬀusion aﬀects workers’ welfare.
Using this framework, I address three related questions.
1. First, I analyze the welfare consequences of productivity diﬀerences across local labor
markets. I seek to understand what happens to the wage, employment and utility
of workers with diﬀerent skill levels when a local economy experiences a shift in the
productivity of a group of workers. I focus on welfare incidence and use the spa-
tial equilibrium model to clarify who ultimately beneﬁts from permanent productivity
shocks.
2. Second, I analyze the causes of productivity diﬀerences across local labor markets. To
a large extent, productivity diﬀerences within a country are unlikely to be exogenous.
I review the theoretical and empirical literature on agglomeration economies, with a
particular focus on studies that are relevant for labor economists.
3. Finally, I discuss the implications for policy, with a special focus on location-based
economic development policies aimed at creating local jobs. I clarify when these policies
are wasteful, when they are eﬃcient and who the expected winners and losers are.
The topic of local labor markets should be of great interest to labor economists for two
reasons. First, the issue of localization of economic activity and its eﬀects on workers’
1welfare is one of the most exciting and promising research grounds in the ﬁeld. This area,
at the intersection of labor and urban economics, is ripe with questions that are both of
fundamental importance for our understanding of how labor markets operate and have deep
policy implications. Why are some cities prosperous while others are not? Given that
factors of production can move freely within a country, why do ﬁrms locate in expensive
labor markets? What are the ultimate eﬀects of these diﬀerences on workers’ welfare? These
questions have intrigued economists for more than two centuries, but it is only in the last
three decades that a body of high quality empirical evidence has begun to surface. The pace
of empirical research in this area has accelerated in the last 10-15 years. It is a topic whose
relative importance within the ﬁeld of labor economics promises to keep growing in the next
decade.
Second, and more generally, the issue of equilibrium in local labor markets should be
of broader interest for all labor economists, even those who are not directly interested in
economic geography per se. With notable exceptions, labor economists have traditionally
approached the analysis of labor market shocks using a partial equilibrium analysis. However,
a partial equilibrium analysis misses important parts of the picture, since the endogenous
reaction of factor prices and quantities can signiﬁcantly alter the ultimate eﬀects of a shock.
Because aggregate shocks to the labor market are rarely geographically uniform, the geo-
graphic reallocation of factors and local price adjustments are empirically important. It is
diﬃcult to fully understand aggregate labor market changes—like changes in relative wages
or employment— if ignoring the spatial dimension of labor markets. Partial equilibrium
analyses can be particularly misleading in the case where the workforce is highly mobile, like
in the US. Labor ﬂows across localities and changes in local prices have the potential to undo
some of the direct eﬀects of labor market shocks. This can profoundly alter the implications
for policy. In this respect, the workings of local labor markets and their spatial equilibrium
cannot be overlooked by labor economists, even those who are working on more traditional
topics like wage determination, wage inequality or unemployment.
As an example, consider a nationwide increase in the productivity of skilled workers in an
industry, say the software industry. Although the shock is nationwide, it aﬀects diﬀerent local
labor markets diﬀerently because the software industry—like most industries—is spatially
concentrated. The eﬀect on the demand for skilled labor in a city like San Jose–in the heart
of Silicon Valley—is likely to be quite diﬀerent from the eﬀect in a city like Phoenix—where
the software sector is nonexistent. In a partial equilibrium setting, the only eﬀect of this
shock is an increase in the nominal wage of skilled workers in San Jose. However, in general
equilibrium this shock propagates to other parts of the economy through changes in factor
prices and quantities. Indeed, in general equilibrium, all agents in the economy are aﬀected,
irrespective of their location and their skill level. Attracted by higher demand, some skilled
workers leave Phoenix and move to San Jose, thus pushing up the cost of housing and
other non-tradable goods there. Unskilled workers in San Jose are aﬀected because cost of
living increases and because of imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.
2On net, some unskilled workers move to Phoenix, attracted by higher real wages. Skilled
and unskilled workers in Phoenix also experience changes in their equilibrium wage, even
if their productivity has not changed, because of changes in their local supply. Following
population changes, owners of land experience changes in the value of their asset, both in San
Jose and Phoenix. In this example, the direct eﬀect of the demand shock is partially oﬀset
by general equilibrium changes due to worker relocation and local price adjustments. The
ultimate change in the nominal and real wage of skilled and unskilled workers—and their
policy implications—are quite diﬀerent from the partial equilibrium change and crucially
depends on the degree of labor mobility and the magnitude of local prices changes.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by reviewing some important facts on diﬀerences
in economic outcomes across local labor markets (Section 2). I focus on diﬀerences in nominal
wages, real wages, productivity and innovation across US metropolitan areas.
I then present the spatial equilibrium model of the labor market (Section 3). The model
is kept deliberately very simple, so that all the equilibrium outcomes have easy-to-interpret
closed-form solutions. At the same time, the model is general enough to capture many key
features of a realistic spatial equilibrium. While there are several versions of the spatial
equilibrium model in the literature, and its basic insights are generally well understood, the
focus on welfare incidence is relatively new.
In general equilibrium, a shock to a local labor market is partially capitalized into housing
prices and partially reﬂected in worker wages. While marginal workers are always indiﬀerent
across locations, the utility of inframarginal workers can be aﬀected by localized shocks. The
model clariﬁes that the welfare consequences of localized productivity shifts depend on which
of the two factors of production—labor or housing—is supplied more elastically at the local
level.1 A lower local elasticity of labor supply implies that a larger fraction of a shock to a
city accrues to workers in that city and a smaller fraction accrues to landowners in that city.
On the other hand, a more inelastic housing supply implies a larger incidence of the shock on
landowners, holding constant labor supply elasticity. This makes intuitive sense: if labor is
relatively less mobile, local workers are able to capture more of the economic rent generated
by the shock. Additionally, a lower local elasticity of labor supply implies a smaller eﬀect
on the utility of workers in non-aﬀected cities, since what links diﬀerent local labor markers
is the potential for worker mobility. The model also clariﬁes how the elasticity of local labor
supply is ultimately governed by workers’ preferences for location.
A particularly interesting case is what happens when there are two skill groups and
one group experiences a localized productivity shock. This question is relevant because skill-
speciﬁc shocks are common and have important consequences for nationwide inequality. The
model clariﬁes how the relative elasticity of labor supply of diﬀerent skill groups governs the
ultimate eﬀect of the shock on the utility of workers in each skill group and in each city.
Having clariﬁed the welfare consequences of productivity diﬀerences across local labor
1Capital is assumed to be supplied with inﬁnite elasticity at a price determined by the international
market.
3markets, I turn to the possible causes of these diﬀerences. Because labor and land costs
vary so much across local labor markets, economists have long suspected that there must
exist signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerences to oﬀset the diﬀerences in factor costs, especially for
industries that produce tradable goods. In the absence of signiﬁcant productivity advantages,
why would ﬁrms that produce tradable goods be willing to locate in places like Silicon Valley,
New York or Boston, which are characterized by exorbitant labor and land costs, rather
than in rural areas or in poorer cities, which are characterized by lower factor prices? Ever
since at least Marshall (1890), economists have posited that these productivity advantages
are not exogenous and may be explained by the existence of agglomeration economies. In
Section 4, I review the existing empirical evidence on agglomeration economies, focusing on
papers that are particularly relevant to labor economists. I address two related questions.
First, what do we know about the magnitude of agglomeration economies? Second, what
do we know about the micro mechanisms that generate agglomeration economies? The past
two decades have seen a signiﬁcant amount of eﬀort devoted to answering these questions.
Overall, there seems to be growing evidence that points to the fact that in many tradable
goods productions, a ﬁrm’s productivity is higher when it locates close to other similar
ﬁrms. Notably, these productivity advantages seems to be increasing not only in geographic
proximity but also in economic proximity. For example, they are larger for pairs of ﬁrms
that share similar labor pools, similar technologies, and similar intermediate inputs. The
exact mechanism that generates these economies of scale remains more elusive. I discuss the
most important explanations that have been proposed and the empirical evidence on each of
them. I conclude that much remains to be done in terms of empirically understanding their
relative importance.
Finally, in Section 5, I discuss the eﬃciency and equity rationales for local development
policies aimed at creating local jobs. In the US, state and local governments spend $30-40
billion per year on these policies, while the federal government spends $8-12 billion. While
these policies are pervasive, their economic rationale is often misunderstood by the public and
economists alike. From the equity point of view, location-based policies aim at redistributing
income from areas with high level of economic activity to areas with low level of economic
activity. In this respect, these policies are unlikely to be eﬀective. The spatial equilibrium
model clariﬁes that in a world where workers are mobile, local prices adjust so that workers
are unlikely to fully capture the beneﬁts of location-based subsidies. When mobility is more
limited, these policies have the potential to aﬀect the utility of inframarginal workers’, but
in ways that are non transparent and diﬃcult to know in advance, because they depend on
individual idiosyncratic preferences for location. From an eﬃciency point of view, the main
rationale for these type of subsidies is the existence of signiﬁcant agglomeration externalities.
If the attraction of new businesses to a locality generates localized productivity spillovers,
then the provision of subsidies may be able to internalize the externality. The magnitude
of the optimal subsidy depends on the exact shape of Marshallian dynamics. In this case,
government intervention may be eﬃcient from the point of view of a locality, although not
4necessarily from the point of view of aggregate welfare.
Ever since Adam Smith wrote his treatise on the ”Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations” more than two centuries ago, economists have sought to understand the underlying
causes of income disparities across regions of the world. While historically economists have
focused on understanding the causes of diﬀerences across countries, the question of diﬀerences
across localities within a country is receiving growing attention. Within county diﬀerences
in productivity and wages are possibly even more remarkable than cross-country diﬀerences,
since the mobility of labor and capital within a country is unconstrained and diﬀerences in
institutions and regulations are small relative to cross-country diﬀerences. As a consequence,
it is diﬃcult to understand why some countries are poor and other countries are rich without
ﬁrst understanding why some cities within a country are poor and others are rich. The issue
of local labor markets is a central one for economists, and much remains to be done to fully
understand it.
2 Some Important Facts About Local Labor Markets
Most countries in the world are characterized by signiﬁcant spatial heterogeneity in eco-
nomic outcomes. For example, in the US there are a limited number of cities producing
most of the country’s output, surrounded by vast areas generating little output. Many other
developed and developing countries show a similar pattern in the distribution of economic
activity.
In this Section, I document the magnitude of the diﬀerences in labor market outcomes
across local labor markets in the United States. In particular, I focus on spatial diﬀerences
in nominal wages, real wages, productivity and innovation and how these diﬀerences have
evolved over the last three decades.2
2.1 Nominal Wages
The vast diﬀerences in output per mile in Figure ?? translate into equally vast diﬀerences
in workers’ wages. The top panel in Figure ?? shows the distribution of average hourly
nominal wage for high school graduates by metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). Data are
from the 2000 Census of Population and include all full-time US workers between the age of
25 and 60 who worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year. The ﬁgure indicates that labor
costs vary signiﬁcantly across US metropolitan areas. The average high school graduate
living in the median metropolitan area earns $14.1 for each hour worked. The 10th and 90th
2Another notable feature of the spatial distribution of economic activity is represented by industry cluster-
ing, whereby ﬁrms tend to cluster near other ”similar” ﬁrms (for example: ﬁrms that sell similar products).
The cluster of IT ﬁrms in Silicon Valley, biomedical research in Boston, biotech in San Diego and San Fran-
cisco, ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Wall Street and London are notable examples. In this section, do not focus on this
feature. However, I discuss its causes and consequences in the following sections.
5percentile of the distribution across metropolitan areas are $12.5 and $16.5, respectively.
This amounts to a 32% diﬀerence in labor costs. The 1st and 99th percentile are $11.9 and
$19.0, respectively, which amounts to a 60% diﬀerence. While some of these diﬀerences may
reﬂect heterogeneity in skill levels within education group, diﬀerences across metropolitan
areas conditional on race, experience, gender, and Hispanic origin are equally large.
The bottom panel in Figure ?? shows the distribution of average hourly nominal wage
for college graduates across metropolitan areas. (Note that the scale in the two panels is
diﬀerent.) The distribution of the average wage of college graduates across metropolitan
areas is even wider than the distribution of the average wage of high school graduates. The
10th and 90th percentile of the distribution for college graduates are $20.5 and $28.5. This
amounts to a 41% diﬀerence in labor costs. The 1st and 99th percentile are $18.1 and $38.5,
respectively, which amounts to a 112% diﬀerence.
Table 1 lists the 10 metropolitan areas with the highest average wage for high school
graduates and the 10 metropolitan areas with the lowest average wage for high school grad-
uates. High school graduates living in Stamford, CT or San Jose, CA earn an hourly wage
that is two times as large as workers living in Brownsville, TX or McAllen, TX with the
same level of schooling. This diﬀerence remains eﬀectively unchanged after accounting for
diﬀerences in workers’ observable characteristics. Table 2 produces a similar list for college
graduates. The diﬀerence between wages in cities at the top of the distributions and cities at
the bottom of the distribution is more pronounced for college graduates. The average hourly
wage of college graduates in Stamford, CT is almost three times larger than the hourly wage
of college graduates in Jacksonville, NC. This diﬀerence is robust to controlling for worker
characteristics.
The wage diﬀerences documented in Figure ?? are persistent over long periods of time.
While in the decades after World War II regional diﬀerences in income were declining (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1991), convergence has slowed down signiﬁcantly in more recent decades.
This can be seen in Figure 1, where I plot the average hourly wage in 1980 against the
average wage in 2000 for high school graduates and college graduates, by metropolitan area.
The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of workers in the relevant metropolitan
area and skill group 1980. The lines are the predicted wages in 2000 from a weighted OLS
regression, where there weights are the number of workers in the relevant metropolitan area
and skill group in 1980.
The ﬁgure suggests that there has been no mean reversion in wages since 1980. In fact,
the opposite has happened. Wage diﬀerences across metropolitan areas have increased over
time. The slope of the regression line is 1.82 (0.89) for high school graduates. This suggests
that metropolitan area where high school graduates have high wages in 1980 compared to
other metropolitan areas have even higher wages in 2000. The slope for college graduates
is 3.54 (.11). The fact that the slope is even higher for college graduates indicates that the
increase in the spatial diﬀerences in hourly wages is larger for skilled workers.
The lack of spatial convergence is also documented in Table 3, where I classify metropoli-
6tan areas as having low or high wage depending on whether the average wage is below or
above the average wage in the median metropolitan area in the relevant year. This is done
separately for each year and each education group. The top panel shows that in most cases,
metropolitan areas where high school graduates have high wages in 1980 also have high wages
in 2000. Only a quarter of metropolitan areas change category. Consistent with the larger
increase in spatial divergence uncovered in Figure 1, this fraction is even smaller for college
graduates (bottom panel).
Using data on total income instead of hourly wages, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) ﬁnd no
evidence of convergenece across metropolitan areas between 1980 and 1990 but they ﬁnd some
evidence of convergece between 1990 and 2000. The diﬀerence between their ﬁndings and
Figure 1 is explained by three factors. First, I am interested in labor market outcomes, so that
my sample includes only workers. By contrast, the Glaeser and Gottlieb sample includes all
individuals. Second, there may be diﬀerences across metropolitan areas in unearned income.
Third, and most importantly, there might be diﬀerences across metropolitan areas in number
of hours worked, since it is well known that, since 1980, workers with high nominal wages
have experienced relatively larger increases in number of hours worked than workers with
low nominal wages. The convergence in total income uncovered by Glaeser and Gottlieb
(2009) in the 1990’s is quantitatively limited. Consistent with my interpretation of of Figure
1, they conclude that although there has been some convergence in income, over the last
three decades ”rich places have stayed rich and poor places have stayed poor”.
When thinking about localization of economic activity, nominal wages are more important
than income because they are related to labor productivity. Since labor, capital and goods
can move freely within a country, it is diﬃcult for an economy in a long-run equilibrium
to maintain signiﬁcant spatial diﬀerences in nominal labor costs in the absence of equally
large productivity diﬀerences. Indeed, if labor markets are perfectly competitive, nominal
wage diﬀerences across local labor markets should exactly reﬂect diﬀerences in the marginal
product of labor in industries that produce tradable goods. If this were not the case, ﬁrms
in the tradable sector located in cities with nominal wages higher than labor productivity
would relocate to less expensive localities. While not all workers are employed in the tradable
sector, as long as there are some ﬁrms producing traded goods in every city and workers can
move between the tradable and non-tradable sector, average productivity has to be higher
in cities where nominal wages are higher.
Overall, if wages are related to marginal product of labor, there appears to be little
evidence of convergence in labor productivity across US metropolitan areas. If anything,
there is evidence of divergence: metropolitan areas that are characterized by high labor
productivity in 1980 are characterized by even higher productivity in 2000. Notably, both the
magnitude of geographic diﬀerences and speed of divergence appear to be more pronounced
for high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers.
72.2 Real Wages
The large diﬀerences in nominal wages documented above do not appear to be associated
with massive migratory ﬂows of workers across metropolitan areas.3 The main reason for
the lack of signiﬁcant spatial reallocation of labor is that land prices vary signiﬁcantly across
locations so that diﬀerences in real wages are signiﬁcantly smaller than diﬀerences in nominal
wages. Figure 2 shows the distribution of average hourly real wage for high school and college
graduates across metropolitan areas. Real wages are calculated as the ratio of nominal wages
and a local CPI that reﬂects diﬀerences in the cost of housing across locations. The index
is described in detail in Moretti (2010). A comparison with Figure ?? indicates that the
distribution of real wages is signiﬁcantly more compressed than the distribution of nominal
wages. For example, the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution for high school graduates
are $10.0 and $11.7. This is only a 17% diﬀerence. The 10th and 90th percentile of the
distribution for college graduates are $16.7 and $20.4, a 22% diﬀerence.
If nominal wages adjust fully to reﬂect cost of living diﬀerences, and if amenity diﬀerences
are not too important, a regression of log nominal wage on log cost of housing should yield
a coeﬃcient approximately equal to the share of income spent on housing (Glaeser and
Gottlieb, 2008). Empirically, I ﬁnd that an individual level regression of log earnings on
average cost of housing in the metropolitan area of residence—measured by the log average
cost of renting a two or three bedroom apartment—controlling for standard observables and
clustering the standard errors by metropolitan area yields a coeﬃcient equal to .513 (.024).4
Given that the share of income spent on housing is about 41% in 2000, this regression lends
credibility to the notion that nominal wages adjust to take into account diﬀerences in the
cost of living across localities.
2.3 Productivity
The vast diﬀerences in nominal wages across local labor markets reﬂect, at least in part,
diﬀerences in productivity. Productivity is notoriously diﬃcult to measure directly. One
empirical measure of productivity at the establishment level is total factor productivity
(TFP), deﬁned as output after controlling for inputs.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of average total factor productivity of manufacturing
establishments in 1992 by county. County-level TFP estimates are obtained from estimates
of production functions based on data from the Census of Manufacturers. Speciﬁcally, they
are obtained from a regression of log output on hours worked by blue collar and white collar
workers, building capital, machinery capital, materials, industry ﬁxed eﬀects and county
ﬁxed eﬀects.5 The level of observation is the establishment. The coeﬃcients on the county
3In a recent review of the evidence, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) conclude that ”there has been little
tendency for people to move to high income areas”.
4Data are from the 2000 Census of Population.
5Regressions are weighted by plant output. The sample is restricted to counties that had 10 or more
8dummies represent county average total factor productivity, holding constant industry, cap-
ital and labor. The distribution of the county ﬁxed eﬀects is shown in Figure 3. The ﬁgure
illustrates that there is substantial heterogeneity in manufacturing productivity across US
counties. The county at the top of the distribution is 2.9 times more productive than the
county at the bottom of the distribution. Log TFP in the counties at the 10th percentile,
median, and 90th percentile are 1.54, 1.70 and 2.20, respectively.
Figure 4 shows how TFP has changed over time. Speciﬁcally, it plots average TFP by
county in 1977 on the x-axis against average TFP by county in 1992 on the y-axis.6 The
regression line comes from a regression of 1992 TFP on 1977 TFP weighted by the inverse
of the county ﬁxed eﬀects’ standard errors.7 The coeﬃcient is .919 (.003), indicating a high
degree of persistence of TFP over time. This coeﬃcient is lower than the corresponding
coeﬃcient for nominal wages in Figure 1. This diﬀerence may indicate that changes in pro-
ductivity are not the only driver of changes in nominal wages across locations. Alternatively
it may indicate that average productivity is measured with more error than average wages
and therefore displays more mean reversion. It is plausible that measured productivity con-
tains more measurement error than measured wages because productivity is inherently more
diﬃcult to measure and because the sample of plants available in the Economic Census is
smaller than the sample of workers available in the Census of Population.
2.4 Innovation
Innovative activity is even more concentrated than overall economic activity. One mea-
sure of innovation is the number of patents ﬁled. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the
number of utility patents ﬁled by each city per year from 1998 to 2002.8 The level of obser-
vation here is the city, as reported in the patent ﬁle. Unlike in the rest of the paper, in this
ﬁgure and the next ﬁgure the deﬁnition of city does not correspond to metropolitan statisti-
cal area. The ﬁgure shows that most cities generate either no patents or a limited number of
patents each year. On the other hand there is a handful of cities that ﬁle a very large number
of patents. Conditional on generating at least 1 patent in the ﬁve years between 1998 and
2002, the median city generates only an average of .4 patents per year, while the city at the
75% percentile has only 2 patents per year. By contrast, the two cities at the top of the
distribution—Santa Clara, CA, in the heart of Silicon valley and Armonk, NY, where IBM
plants in either 1977 or 1992 in the 2xxx or 3xxx SIC codes. There are 2126 counties that satisfy the sample
restriction. For conﬁdentiality reasons, any data from counties whose output was too concentrated in a small
number of plants are not in the ﬁgure (although they are included in the regression).
6There are 1951 counties for which data could be released by the Census. TFP estimates for each year
come from separate regressions for 1977 and 1992.
7This regression does not include an intercept, because both the dependent variable and independent
variable come from separate regressions that include separate constants.
8I include 5 years instead of one to reduce sample noise. Data are from the NBER Patent Database.
Utility patents are typically granted to those who invent or discover a new and useful process or machine.
9is located—generate 3390 and 3630 patents respectively. Houston, San Jose and Palo Alto
follow with 2399, 1906 and 1682 patents per year, respectively.9 Overall, it is pretty clear
that the creation of new technologies and new products is highly spatially concentrated.
Importantly, there is little evidence that the geographic concentration of innovative ac-
tivity is diminishing over time. Indeed, the spatial distribution of innovation appears re-
markably stable over the last 2 decades. This is shown in Figure 6, where I plot the average
yearly number of patents ﬁled in the 1978-1982 period on the x-axis against the average
yearly number of patents ﬁled in the 1998-2002 period on the y-axis. The sample includes
all cities with at least 1 patent ﬁled in either period. For visual clarity, the ﬁgure excludes
3 cities that have more than 2000 patents per year. The regression coeﬃcient (std error)
is 1.009 (.0311), with intercept at 15.41 (2.26). (The regression and the ﬁtted line in the
ﬁgure are both based on the full sample that includes the 3 cities with more than 2000
patents.) The regression indicates that there is no evidence of convergence in innovative
activity. The number of patents per city has increased in this period, but the increase is
exactly proportional to the 1980’s level.
3 Equilibrium in Local Labor Markets
In the previous section I have documented large and persistent diﬀerences in productivity
and wages across local labor markets within the US. In this section, I present a simple general
equilibrium framework intended to address two questions. First, how can these diﬀerences
persist in equilibrium? Second, what are the eﬀects of these diﬀerences on workers in diﬀerent
cities?
Ever since the publication of the models by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), the Rosen-
Roback framework has been the general equilibrium model most frequently used to model
shocks to local economies. For this reason, Glaeser (2010) deﬁnes the Rosen-Roback frame-
work “the workhorse of spatial equilibrium analysis”. The main reasons for its popularity
are its simplicity, tractability, and especially the fact that it captures a very intuitive no-
tion of equilibrium across local labor markets within a country. In its most basic and most
commonly used version (Roback, 1982, Section I), the model assumes that:
1. Each city is a competitive economy that produces a single internationally traded good
using labor, land and a local amenity. Technology has constant returns to scale
2. Workers’ indirect utility depends on nominal wages, cost of housing and local amenities
3. Labor is homogenous in skills and tastes10 and each worker provides one unit of labor
4. Labor is perfectly mobile so that the local labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic
9The city at the 99% percentile generates 178 patents.
10Roback (1988) considers the cases of heterogenous labor.
105. Land is the only immobile factor and its supply is ﬁxed
In its simplest form, and the one that is most commonly used in the literature (Roback,
1982, Section I), the Rosen-Roback key insight is that any local shock to the demand or
supply of labor in a city is, in equilibrium, fully capitalized in the price of land. As a
consequence, shocks to a local economy do not aﬀect worker welfare. Consider, for example,
a productivity shock that makes workers in city c more productive than workers in other
cities. In the Rosen-Roback framework, the increase in productivity in city c results in an
increase in nominal wages in city c and a similar increase in housing costs in city c, so that in
equilibrium workers are completely indiﬀerent between city c and all the other cities. In the
new equilibrium, workers are more productive but they are not better oﬀ. The owners of land
in city c are better oﬀ, by an amount equal to the productivity increase. This result depends
on the assumption that the local labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic and that the elasticity of
housing supply is limited.11
The assumptions of this model are restrictive, and rule out some interesting questions
regarding the incidence of localized shocks to a local economy. In this section, I present a
more general equilibrium framework that seeks to take the spatial equilibrium model a step
closer to reality. The goal of the model is to clarify what happens to wages, costs of housing
and worker utility when a local economy experiences a shock to labor demand or labor
supply. An example of a shock to labor demand is an increase in productivity. An example
of a shock to labor supply is an increase in amenities. I assume that workers and ﬁrms are
mobile across cities, but worker mobility is not necessarily inﬁnite, because workers have
idiosyncratic preferences for certain locations. Moreover, housing supply is not necessarily
ﬁxed. This implies that the elasticity of local labor supply is not necessarily inﬁnite and the
elasticity of housing supply is not necessarily zero. In this context, shocks to a local economy
are not necessarily fully capitalized into land prices. This is important, because it allows
for interesting distributional and welfare implications. The model clariﬁes exactly how the
welfare consequences of localized labor market shocks depend on the relative magnitude of
the elasticities of local labor supply and housing supply.
In Section 3.1 I describe the case of homogenous labor. It is a useful and transparent
11In the simplest form of the model, there is one margin of adjustment that allows to accomodate some
in-migration to the more productive city. While land is assumed to be ﬁxed, workers can adjust their
consumption of housing. When housing prices increase in city c, each worker consumes a little less housing.
This allows a small increase in the number of workers in the more productive city, even with ﬁxed land. In a
more general version of the model, Roback (1982, Section II) keeps the assummption that land is ﬁxed but
allows for the production of housing. Housing production is assumed to use labor, which is perfectly mobile,
and land, which is ﬁxed. In this version of the model, there are two margins of adjustment that allow to
accomodate in-migration to a city. First, like before, workers can adjust their consumption of housing in
response to increases in housing prices. Second, unlike before, the housing stock can increase in response to
increased demand. In this version of the model, more workers change city after a city-speciﬁc productivity
shock. However, the key implication for incidence of the shock does not change. Because workers are assumed
to be perfectly mobile and homogenous, their utility is never aﬀected by the shock.
11starting point. It clariﬁes the role that the elasticity of labor and housing supply play
in determining how shocks to a local economy aﬀect workers’ utility. In reality, however,
workers are not all homogenous but they diﬀer along many dimensions, most notably in their
skill level. Moreover, shocks to local economies rarely aﬀect all workers equally. Instead,
shocks to local economies are often skill-biased in the sense that they shift the demand for
some skill groups more than others. For these reasons, in Section 3.2 I describe the more
general case of heterogenous labor. In Section 3.3 I allow for agglomeration economies. In
Section 3.4 I discuss the case where there are multiple industries within each local economy
and local multipliers. In Section 3.5 I review some of the existing empirical evidence.
Over the years, many versions of the spatial equilibrium model have been proposed. The
version of model that I present is based on Moretti (2010). The proposed framework is based
on assumptions designed to make it very simple and transparent while at the same time not
unrealistic. The model seeks to describe spatial equilibrium in the long run and is probably
not well suited to describe year to year adjustments.12 Topel (1986) and Glaeser (2008)
propose alternative equilibrium frameworks that take into account the dynamics of wages
and employment. Roback (1982), Glaeser (2008) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) propose
frameworks where housing production uses both local labor (and of course land). By contrast,
in my simpliﬁed framework housing production does not use local labor. Combes, Duranton
and Overman (2005) link the spatial equilibrium framework to some of the insights from the
New Economic Geography literature.
3.1 Spatial Equilibrium with Homogeneous Labor
3.1.1 Assumptions and Equilibrium
I begin by considering the case where there is only one type of labor. As in Rosen-
Roback, I assume that each city is a competitive economy that produces a single output
good y which is traded on the international market, so that its price is the same everywhere
and set equal to 1. Workers and ﬁrms are mobile and locate where utility and proﬁts are
maximized. Like in Roback, I abstract from labor supply decisions and I assume that each
worker provides one unit of labor, so that local labor supply is only determined by workers’
location decisions. The indirect utility of worker i in city c is
Uic = wc − rc + Ac + eic (1)
where wc is the nominal wage in city c; rc is the cost of housing; Ac is a measure of local
amenities.13 The random term eic represents worker i idiosyncratic preferences for location
c. A larger eic means that worker i is particularly attached to city c, holding constant real
12The reason is that in the short run, frictions in labor mobility and in housing supply may constrain the
ability of workers and housing stock to fully adjust to shocks.
13In Roback’s terminology, Ac is a consumption amenity.
12wage and amenities. For example, being born in city c or having family in city c may make
city c more attractive to a worker irrespective of city c’s real wages and amenities. Assume
that there are two cities: city a and city b and that worker i’s relative preference for city a
over city b is
eia − eib ∼ U[−s,s] (2)
The parameter s characterizes the importance of idiosyncratic preferences for location and
therefore the degree of labor mobility. If s is large, it means that preferences for location are
important and therefore worker willingness to move to arbitrage away real wage diﬀerences
or amenity diﬀerences is limited. On the other hand, if s is small, preferences for location are
not very important and therefore workers are more willing to move in response to diﬀerences
in real wags or amenities. In the extreme, if s = 0 there are no idiosyncratic preferences for
location and therefore worker mobility is perfect.
While parsimonious, the model captures the four most important factors that might drive
worker mobility: wages, the cost of living, amenities, and individual preferences. A worker
chooses city a if and only if eia −eib > (wb −rb)−(wa −ra)+(Ab −Aa). In equilibrium, the
marginal worker needs to be indiﬀerent between cities. This equilibrium condition implies
that local labor supply is upward sloping, and its slope depends on s. For example, local
labor supply in city b is




where Nc is the endogenously determined log of number of workers in city c; and N =
Na + Nb is assumed ﬁxed. The key point of equation 3 is that the elasticity of local labor
supply depends on worker preferences for location. If idiosyncratic preferences for location
are very important (s is large), then workers are relatively less mobile and the elasticity of
local labor supply is low. In this case, the local labor supply curve is relatively steep. If
idiosyncratic preferences for location are not very important (s is small), then workers are
relatively more mobile and the elasticity of local labor supply is high. In this case, the local
labor supply curve is relatively ﬂat. In the case of perfect mobility (s = 0), the elasticity
of local labor supply is inﬁnite and the local labor supply curve is perfectly ﬂat. In that
case, any diﬀerence in real wages or in amenities, however small, results in an inﬁnitely
large number of workers willing to leave one city for the other.14 The intercept in equation
3 indicates that, for a given slope, if the real wage in city a increases or local amenities
improve, workers leave city b and move to city a.
An important diﬀerence between the Rosen-Roback setting and this setting is that in
Rosen-Roback, all workers are identical, and always indiﬀerent across locations. In this set-
ting, workers diﬀer in their preferences for location. While the marginal worker is indiﬀerent
14Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) model how worker heterogeneity generates an upward sloping local labor
supply and how this aﬀects the spatial distribution of economic acitivity.
13between locations, here there are inframarginal workers who enjoy economic rents. These
rents are larger the smaller the elasticity of local labor supply.15
The production function for ﬁrms in city c is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to
scale, so that
lnyc = Xc + hNc + (1 − h)Kc (4)
where Xc is a city-speciﬁc productivity shifter;16 and Kc is the log of capital. I focus ﬁrst
on the case where Xc is given. Later, I discuss the model with agglomeration economies in
which Xc is a function of density of economic activity or human capital. Firms are assumed
to be perfectly mobile. If ﬁrms are price takers and labor is paid its marginal product, labor
demand in city c is
wc = Xc − (1 − h)Nc + (1 − h)Kc + lnh (5)
I assume that there is an international capital market, and that capital is inﬁnitely
supplied at a given price i.17 I also assume that each worker consumes one unit of housing.
This implies that the (inverse of) the the local demand for housing is just a re-arrangement
of equation 3:




To close the model, I assume that the supply of housing is
rc = z + kcNc (7)
where the number of housing units in city c is assumed to be equal to the number of workers.
The parameter kc characterizes the elasticity of the supply of housing. I assume that this
parameter is exogenously determined by geography and local land regulations. In cities where
geography and regulations make it is easy to build new housing, kc is small (Saiz, 2008) In
the extreme case where there are no constraints to building new houses, the supply curve is
horizontal, and kc is zero. In cities where geography and regulations make it diﬃcult to build
new housing, kc is large. In the extreme case where it is impossible to build new houses, the
supply curve is vertical, and kc is inﬁnite. A limitation of equation 7 is that it implicitly
15It is not easy to obtain credible empirical estimates of the elasticity of local labor supply. First, one needs
to isolate labor market shocks that are both localized and demand driven. Second, one needs to identify
the eﬀect both on wages and land prices. For example, Hornbeck, Greenstone and Moretti (forthcoming)
document that the exogenous opening of a large manufacturing establishment in a county is associated
with a signiﬁcant increase in employment and local nominal wages. The wage increase appears to persist
ﬁve years after the opening of the new plant. However, this result per se does not necessarily imply that
local labor supply is upward sloping. As Equation 3 indicates, what matters in this respect is whether the
demand-driven shift in employment causes wages to increase over and above land costs. The ﬁnding that an
increase in the local demand for labor results in an increase in local wages does not per se imply that local
labor supply is upward sloping. In principle, such ﬁnding is consistent with a spatial equilibrium where the
local supply of labor is inﬁnitely elastic but the supply of housing is inelastic.
16In Roback terminology, Xc is a productive amenity.
17In equilibrium, the marginal product of capital has to be equal to Xc − hKc + hNc + ln(1 − h) = lni.
14makes two assumptions that, while helpful in simplifying the model, are not particularly
realistic. First, housing production in this model does not involve the use of any local input.
Roback (1982) and Glaeser (2008), among others, discuss spatial equilibrium in the case
where housing production involves the use of local labor and other local inputs. Second,
equation 7 ignores the durability of housing. Glaeser and Gyourko (2001) point out that
once built, the housing stock does not depreciate quickly and this introduces an asymmetry
between positive and negative demand shocks. In particular, when demand declines, the
quantity of housing cannot decline, at least in the short run. The possible implications of
this asymmetry are analyzed by Notowidingdo (2010).
Equilibrium in the labor market is obtained by equating equations 3 and 5 for each city.
Equilibrium in the housing market is obtained by equating equations 6 and 7.
In this framework, workers and landowners are separate agents and landowners are as-
sumed to live abroad. While in reality most workers own their residence, keeping workers
separate from landowners has the advantage of allowing me to separately identify the welfare
consequences of changes in housing values from the welfare consequences of changes in labor
income. This is important both for conceptual clarity and for thinking about the diﬀerent
implications of the results for labor and housing policies.18
This model diﬀers from the model of local labor markets proposed by Topel (1986)
because it ignores dynamics. This model also diﬀers from most of the existing versions of
the spatial equilibrium model in that it describes a closed economy with a ﬁxed number of
workers, so that shock to a given city aﬀects the other city. For example, an increase in
labor demand in city b aﬀects labor supply, wages and prices in city a. By contrast, most
existing versions of the spatial equilibrium model assume that local shocks to a city aﬀect
local outcomes there, but have a negligible eﬀect on the rest of the national economy because
the rest of the economy is large relative to the city. (See for example: Glaeser, 2008 and
2009; and Notowidingdo, 2010). In this sense most of the existing models are not truly
general equilibrium models.19
18On the other hand, this assumption has the disadvantage that it misses some important features of
housing and labor markets. When workers are also property owners, a localized increase in housing values
in a city implies both an increase in the value of the asset but also an increase in the user cost of housing.
The only way for property owners to access the increased value of the asset is to move to a diﬀerent city.
19In the interest of simplicity, the model completely ignores congestions costs. Equilibrium is achieved
only because housing costs in a city increase when population increases. In reality, congestion costs (for
example: transportation costs) are probably an another important determinant of equilibrium across cities.
Allowing for congestion costs would not alter the qualitative predictions of the model, but it would result
in smaller predicted increases in housing costs in cities that experience positive productivity shocks. The
reason is simple. As a city becomes more productive and its workforce increases, commuting costs increase,
thus reducing its relative attractiveness.
153.1.2 Eﬀect of a Labor Demand Shock on Wages and Prices
I begin by considering the eﬀect of an increase in labor demand in city b. This demand
increase could be due to a localized technological shock that increases the productivity of
ﬁrms located in city b. Alternatively, it could be due to an improvement in the product
demand faced by ﬁrms in city b. Later, I consider the eﬀect of an increase in labor supply
in city b.
I assume that in period 1, the two cities are identical and in period 2, total factor
productivity increases in city b. Speciﬁcally, I assume that in period 2, the productivity
shifter in b is higher than in period 1: Xb2 = Xb1 + ∆, where ∆ > 0 represents a positive,
localized, unexpected productivity shock.20 I have added subscripts 1 and 2 to denote periods
1 and 2. The amenities in the two cities are assumed to be identical and to remain unchanged.
Workers are now more productive in city b than a. Attracted by this higher productivity,
some workers move from a to b:
Nb2 − Nb1 =
N
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆ ≥ 0 (8)
The equation indicates that number of movers is larger the larger the elasticity of labor
supply (i.e. the smaller is s) and the larger the elasticity of housing supply in city b (i.e. the
smaller is kb). This is not surprising, because a smaller s implies that idiosyncratic preferences
for location are less important, and therefore that labor is more mobile in response to real
wage diﬀerentials. A smaller kb means that it is easier for city b to add new housing units
to accommodate the increased demand generated by the in-migrants.
The nominal wage in city b increases by an amount equal to the productivity increase:
wb2 − wb1 = ∆ (9)
Because of in-migration, the cost of housing in city b needs to increase. The magnitude of
the increase is a fraction of ∆ and depends on how elastic is housing supply in b relative to
a:
rb2 − rb1 =
kbN
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆ ≥ 0 (10)
This increase in housing costs is larger the smaller the elasticity of housing supply in city
b (large kb) relative to city a. Because nominal wages increase more than housing costs
(compare equations 9 and 10), real wages increase in b:
(wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 − rb1) =
kaN + 2s
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆ ≥ 0 (11)
Although the original productivity shock only involves city b, in general equilibrium,
prices in city a are also aﬀected. In particular, out-migration lowers the cost of housing.21
20I am modelling the productivity shock as an increase in total factor productivity. Results are similar in
the case where the shock only increases productivity of labor.
21The change in the cost of housing in a is
ra2 − ra1 = −
kaN
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆ ≤ 0 (12)
16Because the nominal wage in a does not change,22 the net eﬀect is an increase in real wages
in a:
(wa2 − wa1) − (ra2 − ra1) =
kaN
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆ ≥ 0 (13)
It is important to note that in general, real wages diﬀer in the two cities in period 2.
In particular, a comparison of equation 11 with equation 13 indicates that in period 2 real
wages are higher in city b. This is not surprising, because city b is the one directly aﬀected by
the productivity shock. While labor mobility causes real wages to increase in city a as well,
real wages are not fully equalized because mobility is not perfect in that only the marginal
worker is indiﬀerent between the two cities in equilibrium. With perfect mobility (s = 0),
real wages are completely equalized because all workers need to be indiﬀerent between the
two cities.23
The marginal worker in period 2 is diﬀerent from the marginal worker in period 1. Since
city b oﬀers higher real wages in period 2, the new marginal worker in period 2 has stronger
preferences for city a. In particular, the change in the relative preference for city a of the
marginal worker is equal to24
(ea2 − eb2) − (ea1 − eb1) =
2s∆
N(ka + kb) + 2s
≥ 0 (14)
Note that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between cities. Because of the assumptions on technology,
ﬁrms have zero proﬁts in both cities. While labor is now more expensive in b, it is also more
productive there. Because ﬁrms produce a good that is internationally traded, if skilled
workers weren’t more productive, employers would leave b and relocate to a.
In the production function used here, all ﬁrms in a city are assumed to share a city-
speciﬁc productivity shifter. The implicit assumption is that any city-speciﬁc characteristic
aﬀects all ﬁrms equally. For example, the transportation infrastructure, the weather, local
institutions, local regulations, etc. aﬀect the productivity of all producers in the same
way. It would be easy to extend this framework to allow for an additional ﬁrm-city speciﬁc
productivity shifter:
lnyjc = (Xc + Xjc) + hNjc + (1 − h)Kjc (15)
where j indexes a ﬁrm, Xc is a productivity eﬀect shared by all ﬁrms in city c, and Xjc is a
productivity eﬀect that is speciﬁc to ﬁrm j and city c. This formulation allows some ﬁrms
to beneﬁt more from some city characteristics than others. For example, the speciﬁc type of
local infrastructure in a given city may aﬀect the TFP of some ﬁrms more than others. This is
.
22This may look surprising at ﬁrst. Given that the number of workers has declined, and that the demand
curve is downward sloping, one might expect an increase in wages of those workers who stay in a. Indeed,
this would be true in a model without capital. But in a model that includes capital, the amount of capital
used by ﬁrms declines in b and increases in a. This capital ﬂow oﬀ-sets the changes in labor supply.
23To see this, compare equation 11 with 13, setting s = 0.
24This change is by construction equal to the change in the diﬀerence in real wages between the two cities.
17analagous to introducing individual speciﬁc location preferences in workers’ utility functions.
For the same reason that preferences for location make workers less responsive to diﬀerences
in real wages across locations, the term Xjc makes ﬁrms less mobile. Eﬀectively, some ﬁrms
enjoy economic rents generated by their location-ﬁrm speciﬁc match. Small diﬀerences in
production costs may not be enough to induce these ﬁrms to relocate, in the same way that
worker idiosyncratic preferences for location lower the elasticity of labor supply.
3.1.3 Incidence: Who Beneﬁts From the Productivity Increase?
In this setting, the beneﬁt of the increase in productivity ∆ is split between workers and
landowners.25 Equations 10, 11, 12 and 13 clarify that the incidence of the shock depends
on which of the two factors—labor or land—is supplied more elastically at the local level.
In turn, the elasticity of local labor supply and the elasticity of housing supply ultimately
depend on the preference parameter s and the supply parameters ka and kb. For a given
elasticity of housing supply, a lower local elasticity of labor supply implies that a larger
fraction of the productivity shock in city b accrues to workers in city b, and a smaller fraction
accrues to landowners in city b. Intuitively, when labor is relatively less mobile, it captures
more of the economic rent generated by the productivity shock. A lower local elasticity of
labor supply also implies a smaller increase in real wages in the non aﬀected city (city a),
since the channel that generates beneﬁts for the non aﬀected city is the potential for worker
mobility.
On the other hand, for a given elasticity of labor supply, a lower elasticity of housing
supply in city b relative to city a (kb bigger than ka) implies that housing quantity adjusts
less in city b following the productivity shock. As a consequence, housing prices increase
more and a larger fraction of the productivity gain accrues to landowners in city b and a
smaller fraction accrues to workers.
The role played by the elasticity of labor and housing supply in determining the incidence
of the productivity shock between workers and landowners and between city a and city b is
clearly illustrated in four special cases.
1. If labor is completely immobile (s = ∞), equation 11 becomes (wb2−wb1)−(rb2−rb1) =
∆, indicating that real wages in city b increase by the full amount of the productivity
shock. In this case, the beneﬁt of the shock accrues entirely to workers in city b. The
intuition is that if labor is a ﬁxed factor, workers in the city hit by the shock capture the
full economic rent generated by the shock. Nothing happens to workers in a, as their
real wage is unchanged: equation 13 becomes (wa2 −wa1)−(ra2 −ra1) = 0. Moreover,
since no worker moves in equilibrium, housing prices in both cities remain unchanged
so that landowners are indiﬀerent. For example, equation 10 becomes rb2 − rb1 = 0,
indicating that housing prices in b are not aﬀected.
25By construction: ∆ = change in real wage in a + change in real wage in b + change in land price in a
+ change in land price in b.
182. If labor is perfectly mobile (s = 0), equations 11 and 13 become: (wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 −
rb1) = (wa2 − wa1) − (ra2 − ra1) = ka
ka+kb∆. Because of perfect labor mobility, real
wages need to be identical in a and b, otherwise workers would leave one city for the
other. In this case, incidence depends on the relative elasticities of housing supply in
the two cities. To see this, note that the increase in real wages is a fraction ka
ka+kb of
∆. The rest of ∆ accrues to landowners in b, since housing prices in b increase by
rb2 − rb1 =
kb
ka+kb∆. The fraction that accrues to workers depends on which of the two
cities has more elastic housing supply. For example, if the elasticity of housing supply
is the same in a and b, than we have an equal split between workers and landowners,
with real wages in both cities increasing by 1
2∆, and land prices in b increasing by 1
2∆.
On the other hand, if the elasticity of housing supply is larger in city b then landowners
capture less of the total economic rent, because their factor is more elastically supplied
in the city originally hit by the shock.
3. If housing supply in b is ﬁxed (kb = ∞), the entire productivity increase is capitalized
in land values in city b. This is the Rosen-Roback case described above. City b becomes
more productive but it cannot expand its workforce because housing cannot expand.
No one can move to city b, and the only eﬀect of the productivity shock is to raise
cost of housing by rb2 − rb1 = ∆. All the beneﬁt goes to landowners in b. Real wages
are not aﬀected, and workers in both cities are indiﬀerent. This is a case where, even
in the presence of a shock that makes some ﬁrms more productive, labor is prevented
from accessing this increased productivity by the constraints on housing supply. Part
of the increase in productivity is therefore wasted.
4. If housing supply in b is inﬁnitely elastic (kb = 0), then equation 10 becomes rb2−rb1 =
0, indicating that housing prices in b do not change. For each additional worker who
intends to move to city b, a housing unit is added so that housing prices never increase.
Landowners are indiﬀerent, and the entire beneﬁt of the productivity increase accrues
to workers. Equation 11 becomes (wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 − rb1) = ∆, indicating that real
wages in city b increase by the full amount of the productivity shock. Real wages in
city a also increase, but less than in b: (wa2 − wa1) − (ra2 − ra1) = kaN
Nka+2s∆.
3.1.4 Eﬀect of a Labor Supply Shock on Wages and Prices
So far, I have focused on what happens to a local economy following a shock generated
by a labor demand shift. What distinguishes city b from city a, is that in city b the demand
for labor is higher. I now discuss the opposite case, where a local economy experiences an
increase in the supply of labor. Speciﬁcally, I consider what happens when city b becomes
more desirable for workers relative to city a. I assume that in period 2, the amenity level
increases in city b: Ab2 = Ab1+∆′, where ∆′ > 0 represents the improvement in the amenity.
I assume that the amenity level in a does not change, and that productivity is the same in
19the two cities.26
As in the case of a demand shift above, N
N(ka+kb)+2s∆′ workers move from a to b. As
before, the cost of housing increases in b (by the amount in equation 10) and declines in a
(by the amount in equation 12). Also, similar to before, the nominal wage in a does not
change. A diﬀerence with the demand shock case is that the nominal wage in b does not
increase, but it remains unchanged.27
As a consequence, real wages decline in city b
(wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 − rb1) = −
kbN
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆
′ ≤ 0 (16)
and increase in city a:
(wa2 − wa1) − (ra2 − ra1) =
kaN
N(ka + kb) + 2s
∆
′ ≥ 0 (17)
Intuitively, workers are willing to take a negative compensating diﬀerential in the form
of lower real wages to live in the more desirable city. Landowners in b experience an increase
in their property values, while landowners in a experience a decline.
The incidence of the shock is similar to what I discuss in section 3.1.3. As with the case
of a demand shock, the exact magnitude of workers’ and landowners’ gains and losses depend
on the elasticity of labor supply and the elasticity of housing supply. The four special cases
outlined in section 3.1.3 apply to this case as well.
3.2 Spatial Equilibrium with Heterogenous Labor
In Section 3.1, I have considered the case where all workers are identical in terms of
productivity. In this section, I consider the case where there are 2 types of workers: skilled
workers (type H) and unskilled workers (type L). I assume that skilled and unskilled workers
in the same city face the same housing market. I discuss what happens in equilibrium when
the demand for one group changes in one city, while the demand for the other group remains
unchanged.
26Here, the labor supply increase is a consequence of an increase in amenities, holding constant tastes.
Results are similar if one assumes that amenities are ﬁxed, but the taste for those amenities increases.
27This may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst. One might expect wage decreases in response to supply increases.
Why do nominal wages not decline in b after it has become more attractive? After all, workers should
be willing to take a negative compensating diﬀerential in the form of lower nominal wages to live in the
more desirable city. Indeed, this is what a model without capital would predict. However, such a model
ignores the endogenous reaction of capital. In a model with capital, nominal wages do not move in city b
because capital ﬂows to b, oﬀsetting the changes in labor supply. The amount of capital increases in b by
Kb2 − Kb1 = N∆
′
N(ka+kb)+2s ≥ 0 and decreases in a by Ka2 − Ka1 = − N∆
′
N(ka+kb)+2s ≤ 0 .
203.2.1 Assumptions and Equilibrium
The indirect utilities of skilled workers and unskilled workers in city c are assumed to be,
respectively
UHic = wHc − rc + AHc + eHic (18)
and
ULic = wLc − rc + ALc + eLic (19)
In equations 18 and 19, skilled and unskilled workers in a city face the same price of housing
so that a shock to the labor demand of one group may be transmitted to the other group
through its eﬀect on housing prices.28 While they have access to the same local amenities,
diﬀerent skill groups do not need to value these amenities equally: AHc and ALc represent the
skill-speciﬁc value of local amenities. Tastes for location can vary by skill group. Speciﬁcally,
I assume that skilled workers’ and unskilled workers’ relative preferences for city a over city
b are, respectively
eHia − eHib ∼ U[−sH,sH] (20)
and
eLia − eLib ∼ U[−sL,sL] (21)
For example, the case in which skilled workers are more mobile than unskilled workers can
be modelled by assuming that sH < sL.
For simplicity, I focus on the case where skilled and unskilled workers in the same city
work in diﬀerent ﬁrms. This amounts to assuming away imperfect substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis, and it is not crucial.
The production function for ﬁrms in city c that use skilled labor is Cobb-Douglas with
constant returns to scale: lnyHc = XHc+hNHc+(1−h)KHc, where KHc is the log of capital
and XHc is a skill and city-speciﬁc productivity shifter. Similarly, the production function
for ﬁrms that use unskilled labor is lnyLc = XLc + hNLc + (1 − h)KLc. The rest of the
assumptions remain unchanged.29
28It is easy to relax this assumption by assuming residential segregation along skill lines within a city.
However, this assumption would not be particularly realistic. Although skilled and unskilled individuals
may reside in diﬀerent parts of a metropolitan area, there always is some overlap which ensures that shocks
to a part of the metropolitan area get transmitted to the rest of the area. Empirically, changes in housing
prices across neighborhoods within a city are highly correlated.
29Because skilled and unskilled workers face the same housing market within a city, to obtain the (inverse
of) the aggregate demand curve for housing in a city one needs to sum the demand of skilled workers and








sL(wHa − wHb − ra)
(sL + sH)
−
sH(wLa − wLb − ra)
(sL + sH)
(22)
213.2.2 Eﬀect of a Labor Demand Shock on Wages and Prices
Consider the case where the relative demand for skilled labor increases in b. See Moretti
(2010) for the specular case where the relative supply for skilled labor increases in b.
Assume that the productivity of skilled workers increases relative to the productivity of
unskilled workers in city b because the productivity shifter for skilled workers in city b is
higher in period 2 than in period 1: XHb2 = XHb1 + ∆, where ∆ > 0 represents a positive,
localized, skill-biased productivity shock. Nothing happens to the productivity of unskilled
workers in b and the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers in a. The amenities in the
two cities are identical and ﬁxed.
Attracted by higher labor demand, some skilled workers move to b from a. In particular,
the number of skilled workers in b increases by
NHb2 − NHb1 =
∆N((ka + kb)N + 2sL)
2h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
≥ 0 (23)
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2h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≤ 0 (25)
The intuition for the ﬁrst derivative is obvious: a higher elasticity of labor supply for
skilled workers implies that skilled workers are more mobile. The intuition for the second
derivative is less obvious. A higher elasticity of labor supply for unskilled workers implies
that a larger number of unskilled workers move out in response to the inﬂow of skilled
workers, so that the increase in housing costs is more limited which ultimately increases the
number of skilled in-migrants.
The number of movers in equation 23 also depends positively on on the elasticity of






h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≤ 0 (26)
A higher elasticity of housing supply (lower kb) implies that more housing units become
available for the incoming skilled workers.
Because skilled workers in b have become more productive, their nominal wage increases
by an amount ∆/h, proportional to the productivity increase. Following the inﬂow of skilled
workers, the cost of housing in b increases and the increase is larger the smaller is sH and
the larger is kb:30
rb2 − rb1 =
sLNkb∆
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
≥ 0 (27)
30Because of the decline in the number of workers, the cost of housing in a declines by the same amount.
22Skilled workers in both cities experience increases in real wages. In b, the increase in real
wages is smaller than the increase in nominal wages because of the increase in the cost of
housing:
(wHb2 − rb2) − (wHb1 − rb1) =
kaNsH + kbNsH + kaNsL + 2sHsL
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≥ 0 (28)
It is easy to see that this change is less than the increase in nominal wages, ∆/h. Since
nominal wages don’t change and housing costs decline, real wages for skilled workers in a
also increase, but by les than in b:
(wHa2 − ra2) − (wHa1 − ra1) =
sLkaN
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≥ 0 (29)
By comparing equation 28 with 29, it is easy to conﬁrm that (wHb2 − rb2) − (wHb1 − rb1) ≥
(wHa2 − ra2) − (wHa1 − ra1).
What happens to unskilled workers? In city b their productivity and nominal wages don’t
change, but housing costs increase. As a consequence, their real wage in b decreases by
(wLb2 − rb2) − (wLb1 − rb1) = −
sLNkb
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≤ 0 (30)
Eﬀectively, unskilled workers in b compete for scarce housing with skilled workers, and the
inﬂow of new skilled workers hurts unskilled workers through higher housing costs. (For the
same reason, the real wage of unskilled workers in a increases.) Since their real wage has
declined, the number of unskilled workers in b declines by
NLb2 − NLb1 = −
N2(ka + kb)
2h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≤ 0 (31)
The overall population of city b increases. This is because the number of skilled workers who
move to city b is larger than the number of unskilled workers who leave city b. On net
(NHb2 + NLb2) − (NHb1 + NLb1) =
∆NsL
h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
≥ 0 (32)
An assumption of this model is that skilled and unskilled workers are employed by dif-
ferent ﬁrms, so that the labor market is segregated by skill within a city. This assumption
eﬀectively rules out imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor. In a more
general setting, skilled and unskilled workers work in the same ﬁrm. Most of the results
in this section generalize, but the equilibrium depends on the degree of imperfect substi-
tution between skilled and unskilled labor.31 Speciﬁcally, complementarity between skilled
and unskilled workers implies that the marginal product of unskilled workers increases in
the number of skilled workers in the same ﬁrm. Thus, the inﬂow of skilled workers in city b
caused by the increase in their productivity endogenously raises the productivity of unskilled
workers in city b. As a consequence, the real wage of unskilled workers declines less than
in the case described above. This mitigates the negative eﬀect on the welfare of unskilled
workers in city b and it reduces the number of unskilled workers who leave the city.
31Given that the focus is on skill-biased productivity shocks, a CES technology is more appropriate for
the case of integrated labor markets than a Cobb-Douglas technology.
233.2.3 Incidence: Changes in Wage and Utility Inequality
The model yields three conclusions regarding the incidence of the skill-biased localized
shock.
First, to the extent that mobility is not perfect, a non-degenerate equilibrium is possible.
After a shock that makes one group more productive, both groups are still represented in
both cities. This conclusion hinges upon the assumption of a less than inﬁnite elasticity of
local labor supply. When the productivity shock attracts skilled workers to city b, housing
prices increase there, and unskilled workers begin to leave, since their real wage is lower than
in city a. The inﬂow of skilled workers to the city eﬀectively displaces some unskilled workers.
In the absence of individual preferences for location, no unskilled worker would remain in
city b and the equilibrium would be characterized by complete geographic segregation of
workers by skill level. This is clearly not realistic, since in reality we never observe cities
that are populated by workers of only one type. In the presence of individual preferences for
location, those unskilled workers who have a strong preference for city b over city a opt to
stay in city b, even if their real wage is lower in b. Those who leave are those who are less
attached to city b.
Therefore, the marginal unskilled worker has weaker preferences for city a after the
shock than before the shock. The change in the relative preference for city a of the marginal
unskilled worker is equal to
(eLa2 − eLb2) − (eLa1 − eLb1) = −
sLN(ka + kb)
h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
∆ ≤ 0 (33)
The opposite is true for skilled workers. Because their real wage has increased in city b more
than in city a, the marginal skilled worker has stronger preferences for city a after the shock:
(eHa2 − eHb2) − (eHa1 − eHb1) =
sH(kaN + 2sL + kbN)
h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
∆ ≥ 0 (34)
Second, skilled workers in both cities and landowners in city b beneﬁt from the productivity
increase. Inframarginal unskilled workers in city b are negatively aﬀected, and inframarginal
unskilled workers in city a are positively aﬀected. It is important to highlight that that,
although inframarginal unskilled workers in city b are made worse oﬀ by the decline in their
real wage, they are still better oﬀ in city b than in city a because of their idiosyncratic
preferences for location.
The magnitude of these changes in utility for skilled and unskilled workers and for
landowners crucially depends on the elasticities of labor supply of the two groups (which
are governed by the preference parameters sH and sL) and the elasticities of housing supply
in the two cities (which are governed by the parameters ka and kb). The intuition is related
to the intuition provided above for the incidence in the case of homogenous labor, although
it is complicated by the fact that each group’s location decisions aﬀect the other group’s
utility through changes in housing prices. For example, the gain in real wages experienced
24in equilibrium by skilled workers in city b is large if their mobility is low (sH is large):
∂((wHb2 − rHb2) − (wHb1 − rHb1))
∂sH
=
(kaN + 2sL + kbN)sLNkb∆
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≥ 0
(35)
Low mobility implies that fewer skilled workers are willing to leave a and move to b, so
that residents of b experience a smaller increase in the cost of housing. Similarly, the gain
in real wages experienced in equilibrium by skilled workers in city b is large if the mobility
of unskilled workers is high (sL is small):




h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≤ 0
(36)
If unskilled workers are highly mobile, more of them leave the city in response to the
increase in housing costs. The ultimate equilibrium increase in housing costs is therefore
smaller, and this results in a higher real wage (and higher utility) for inframarginal skilled
workers in b.
Additionally, the increase in real wages experienced by skilled workers in city b is large if
the elasticity of housing supply in b is high (kb is small), because a high elasticity of housing
supply in b implies that for a given increase in city size, the increase in housing costs is small,
and this translates into a larger increase into equilibrium real wages for skilled workers:
∂((wHb2 − rHb2) − (wHb1 − rHb1))
∂kb
= −
N∆sL(2sHsL + kaNsH + kaNsL)
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≤ 0
(37)
The opposite argument applies to unskilled workers. The decline in their equilibrium real
wage in city b depends positively on their elasticity of labor supply:




h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≤ 0
(38)
and negatively on the elasticity of labor supply for skilled workers:
∂((wLb2 − rLb2) − (wLb1 − rLb1))
∂sH
=
(kaN + 2sL + kbN)sLNkb∆
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)2 ≥ 0
(39)
A small elasticity of labor supply for unskilled workers implies that unskilled workers
have strong idiosyncratic preferences for location, so that few move in response to the loss
in real wage. With perfect mobility (sL = 0), they experience no loss in real wage (See
equation 30). Additionally, a large sH implies that skilled workers have low mobility so that
few move in response to the increase in their wage. The ultimate increase in the price of
land is therefore small, so the utility loss for inframarginal unskilled workers in b is more
contained. With no mobility of skilled workers (sH = ∞), unskilled workers experience no
change in the real wages.
25For landowners, a higher elasticity of housing supply in city b relative to city a (kb smaller
than ka) implies that housing quantity adjusts more in city b so that a smaller fraction of
the productivity gain accrues to landowners.
A third conclusion of the model is that the diﬀerence in nominal wages between skilled
and unskilled workers increases nationwide more than the diﬀerence in utility between skilled
and unskilled workers. To see this, note that the diﬀerence between the change in the skilled-
unskilled nominal wage gap and the change in the skilled-unskilled utility gap is
NkD2sL(sL + 2kN)
2h2(kNsH + sHsL + kNsL)2 ≥ 0 (40)
which is non-negative, indicating that the relative nominal wage of skilled workers grows
more than their relative utility. The intuition is that the beneﬁts of a higher nominal wage
for skilled workers are in part eroded by the higher cost of housing they are exposed to, so
that their relative utility does not increase as much as one might have thought just based
on the increase in their relative nominal wage (Moretti, 2010).
3.3 Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the productivity of ﬁrms in the two cities is determined by the
city-speciﬁc productivity parameter Xc, which is taken as given. I now consider the case
where there are agglomeration economies so that the productivity of ﬁrms in a locality is
an endogenous function of the level of economic activity in that locality. This amounts to
endogenizing the the city-speciﬁc productivity shifter. For example, one can assume that
productivity in a locality is a function of the number of workers in that locality, so that
Xc = f(Nc) with f′ > 0. In this case, the location decisions of workers generates a positive
externality. In Section 4 I discuss in detail the possible sources of agglomeration economies.
As in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, a locality that is for some reason more productive attracts more
workers. But unlike Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the increase in population has the additional eﬀect
of further increasing productivity of local ﬁrms. This in turn attracts even more workers
and the process continues to the point where land prices are high enough that marginal
workers and ﬁrms are made indiﬀerent between locations. Most of the results on incidence
presented above remain true. The main diﬀerence with the previous analysis is that the
existence of agglomeration economies has the potential to generate multiple equilibria, with
some equilibria characterized by low economic activity, low cost of housing and low nominal
wages, and other equilibria characterized by high economic activity, high cost of housing and
high nominal wages.32
For concreteness, consider the case of homogenous labor and assume a speciﬁc functional
form for the agglomeration externality: Xc = xc + γNc, where the parameter γ governs the
32Glaeser (2008) proposes a comprehensive theoretical equilibrium framework with agglomeration exter-
nalities. See also Combes, Duranton and Overman (2005) for a useful big-pictutre graphical treatement of
spatial equlilibrium with agglomeration economies.
26strength of agglomeration economies. In the version of the model without agglomeration
spillovers (γ = 0), labor demand has the standard downward sloping shape (see equation 5).
With agglomeration spillovers, this is not necessarily the case. Equation 5 becomes
wc = xc + (γ − (1 − h))Nc + (1 − h)Kc + lnh (41)
An increase in the number of workers employed in a city has two opposing eﬀects. On the
one hand, because of the standard assumptions on technology, an increase in the number of
workers lowers the marginal product of labor. On the other hand, the increase in population
raises labor productivity. If the agglomeration spillover is strong enough (γ > (1 − h)), the
labor demand function in a city may be upward sloping.
As in Section 3.1, assume that the two cities are identical in period 1, and that in period
2 city b experiences an exogenous increase in productivity of size ∆, so that xb2 = xb1 + ∆.
This initial increase in productivity pushes nominal wages up and higher nominal wages
attract more workers to city b. The arrival of new workers in city b generates productivity
spillovers and, as a consequence, the initial productivity diﬀerence is magniﬁed.
It is informative to compare the equilibrium in the case where there are agglomeration
spillovers (γ > 0) with the case where there are no spillovers (γ = 0). In the presence of
spillovers, a productivity shock of size ∆ in city b results in an increase in the equilibrium
nominal wage that is larger than ∆:
wb2 − wb1 =
h(N(ka + kb) + 2s) − γN
h(N(ka + kb) + 2s) − 2γN
∆ ≥ ∆ ≥ 0 (42)
This is to be expected, because the agglomeration spillover magniﬁes the eﬀect of the pro-
ductivity shock. By contrast, in the case with no spillovers (γ = 0), the increase in nominal
wage in city b is exactly equal to ∆. (See equation 9). Not surprisingly, the larger is the
magnitude of the agglomeration spillover—i.e. the larger the parameter γ—the larger is the




Nh(N(ka + kb) + 2s)∆
(2γN − 2hs − kbNh − kaNh)2 ≥ 0 (43)
Exactly as in Section 3.1, the higher productivity in city b attracts more workers there.
The number of workers in city b increases by
Nb2 − Nb1 =
Nh
h(N(ka + kb) + 2s) − 2γN
∆ ≥ 0 (44)
Just as in the standard case without agglomeration spillovers, if housing supply is not
inﬁnitely elastic, the increase in the population of city b ultimately results in higher housing
costs:
rb2 − rb1 =
kbNh
h(N(ka + kb) + 2s) − 2γN
∆ ≥ 0 (45)
27It is obvious from equations 44 and 45 that the increase in city size and the consequent
increase in housing costs are larger the larger is the spillover (i.e. the large is γ). If the
spillover is zero, equations 44 and 45 revert to equations 8 and 10 in Section 3.1.
Since both nominal wages and housing costs increase in b, the ultimate eﬀect on real wages
is ambiguous and depends on whether the increase in nominal wage is larger or smaller than
the increase in housing costs. In particular, the change in the equilibrium real wage is
(wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 − rb1) =
(kaN + 2s)h − γN
h(N(ka + kb) + 2s) − 2γN
∆ (46)
which is clearly smaller than the increase in nominal wage in equation 42. This equation
indicates that the change in the real wage depends on the magnitude of the spillover relative
to other parameters. To see exactly how the change in the equilibrium real wage depends
on γ, note that
∂((wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 − rb1))
∂γ
=
Nh(N(ka − kb) + 2s)∆
(2γN − 2hs − kbNh − kaNh)2 (47)
which can be either positive or negative depending on whether (N(ka − kb) + 2s) > 0
or (N(ka − kb) + 2s) < 0. If the elasticity of housing supply in city b is larger or equal
to the elasticity of housing supply in city a, the derivative is positive, indicating that the
change in the equilibrium real wage in city b is positively associated with the strength of the
agglomeration spillover γ. In this case, the increase in real wages in equation 46 for the case
of positive agglomeration spillovers is larger than the increase in real wages in equation 11
for the case with no spillovers.
On the other hand, if the elasticity of housing supply in b is small enough relative to the
elasticity of housing supply a, the derivative is negative, and the change in the equilibrium
real wage in city b is negatively associated with the strength of the spillover.33 Intuitively,
if the elasticity of housing supply in b is small (large kb), housing prices in b increase more
following the productivity shock, and this increase lowers the equilibrium real wages for a
given increase in the nominal wage. In the extreme, if the elasticity of housing supply in b
is zero (kb = ∞), the equilibrium real wage does not change. To see why, note that if the
elasticity of housing supply in b is zero nobody can move to city b because no new housing
unit can be added and equations 42 and 45 become
wb2 − wb1 = ∆ (50)
33The change in real wages in city a is smaller than the change in b:
(wa2 − wa1) − (ra2 − ra1) =
kaNh − γN
h(N(ka + kb) + 2s) − 2γN
∆ ≥ 0 (48)
The derivative of this change with respect to γ is
∂((wa2 − wa1) − (ra2 − ra1))
∂γ
=
Nh(N(ka − kb) − 2s)∆
(2γN − 2hs − kbNh − kaNh)2 ≥ 0 (49)
28and
rb2 − rb1 = ∆ (51)
In this case, the increase in the nominal wage is exactly equal to the productivity shock
∆ even in the presence of agglomeration spillovers because the constraint on labor mobility
eﬀectively rules out endogenous changes in total factor productivity Xc. The increase in
housing prices is exactly equal to the productivity shock ∆ because the lack of any response
in the supply of housing implies that the entire productivity shock gets capitalized into land
prices. Since both nominal wages and housing cost increase by the same amount ∆, equation
46 becomes
(wb2 − wb1) − (rb2 − rb1) = 0 (52)
In sum, even with agglomeration economies it is possible (although not necessary) to
have a non degenerate equilibrium where both cities have positive population. Qualitatively,
the incidence of the productivity shock is not very diﬀerent from the case discussed above
where there are no agglomeration economies.
3.4 Spatial Equilibrium with Tradable and Non-Tradable Indus-
tries
In the model presented above, the only consumption good is a homogenous tradable
good. In reality, however, cities produce and consume a variety of goods, both tradable and
non-tradable. Here I discuss how this may aﬀect the equilibrium. This discussion is largely
based on Moretti (2010).
Assume that there are K tradable industries producing goods x1,x2,x3,...,xK and M
non-tradable industries, producing goods z1,z2,...,zM. Consider the case of a positive shock
to productivity in tradable industry x1 in city c. The direct eﬀect of this shock is an increase
in employment in industry x1. The indirect eﬀect is a change in employment both in the
rest of the tradable sector and in the non-tradable sector.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect on the non-tradable sector. Following the shock to sector x1,
aggregate income in the city increases for two reasons. First, there are more local jobs;
second, if local labor supply is upward sloping, as in section 3.1, local wages are also higher.
The increase in the city budget constraint results in an increase in the local demand for
non-tradables z1,z2,...,zM. Employment in industries like restaurants, theaters, real estate,
cleaning services, legal services, construction, medical services, retail, personal services, etc.
grows both because the city has more workers and wages are higher. The magnitude of
the multiplier eﬀect depends on three factors. First, it depends on consumer preferences for
tradables and non-tradables and the technology in the non-tradable sector. If preferences are
such that a larger share of income is spent on locally produced non-tradables, the multiplier
29is larger, everything else constant. Similarly, a more labor intensive technology in the non-
tradable sector results in a larger multiplier, everything else constant. Second, it depends on
the type of new jobs in the tradable sector. Adding skilled jobs in x1 should have a larger
multiplier than adding unskilled jobs, because skilled jobs pay higher earnings and therefore
generate a larger increase in the demand for local services.
Third, there are oﬀsetting general equilibrium eﬀects on wages and prices. As explained
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the magnitude of these eﬀects ultimately depend on the elasticities
of local labor and housing supply. If those elasticities are not inﬁnite, local wages, land
prices and the price on non-tradables increase following the shock to x1. In turn, this
city-wide increase in labor and land costs causes a decline in the supply of local services.
This decline partially—but not fully—undoes the eﬀect of the increase in demand for local
services. Eﬀectively, the addition of jobs in x1 partially crowds out jobs in other industries.
If labor supply is locally very elastic, this crowding out is more limited and the increase in
labor costs is small, making the multiplier larger.
The shock to industry x1 may also aﬀect employment in tradable industries x2,x3,...,xK
although the direction of the eﬀect is unclear a priori. This eﬀect is governed by three
diﬀerent forces. First, and most importantly, the city-wide increase in labor costs hurts em-
ployment in x2,x3,...,xK. Because these are tradable industries, the increase in production
costs lowers their competitiveness. Unlike in the case of non-tradable goods, the price of
tradable goods is set on the national market and cannot adjust to local economic condi-
tions. In the long run, some of the production in these industries is likely to be shifted to
diﬀerent cities. Second, the increase in production of x1 may increase the local demand for
intermediate goods and services. In this case, some elements of the vector x2,x3,...,xK are
inputs to produce x1. This eﬀect depends on the geography of the industry supply chain.
While many industries are geographically clustered, the magnitude of this eﬀect is likely to
be quantitatively limited if the market for x2,x3,...,xK is truly national. Third, if agglom-
eration economies are important, the increase in production in sector x1 may result in more
local agglomeration (see Section 4).
Carrington (1996), Moretti (2010) and Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005) estimate
the employment multiplier at the local level. Carrington (1996) focuses on the short-run
multiplier generated by the construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System. He ﬁnds
evidence that the increase in construction jobs caused by the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System
had signiﬁcant multipliers for jobs in other parts of the non-tradable sector in Alaska. In
contrast, Moretti (2010) focuses on long-run multipliers. He quantiﬁes the long-term change
in the number of jobs in a city’s tradable and non-tradable sectors generated by an exogenous
increase in the number of jobs in the tradable sector, allowing for the endogenous reallocation
of factors and adjustment of prices. He ﬁnds that for each additional job in manufacturing
in a given city, 1.6 jobs are created in the non-tradable sector in the same city. This eﬀect is
signiﬁcantly larger for skilled jobs: adding one additional skilled job in the tradable sector
generates 2.5 jobs in local goods and services, while adding one additional unskilled job in
30the tradable sector generates 1 job in local good and services. Industry-speciﬁc multipliers
indicate that high-tech industries have the largest multiplier. Using a diﬀerent time horizon,
and focusing on time-varying localized shocks to the coal mining sector, Black, McKinnish
and Sanders (2005) uncover smaller multipliers. They ﬁnd that each additional mining job
generates 0.17 non-tradable jobs. Interestingly, the estimated eﬀect is not symmetric. The
loss of a mining job results in the loss of 0.34 non-tradable jobs.
Theory suggests that the local multiplier for the tradable sector should be smaller than the
one for the non-tradable sector, and possibly even negative. Consistent with this hypothesis,
Carrington (1996), Moretti (2010) and Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005) fail to ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant eﬀect of employment in the tradable sector.
The magnitude of local multipliers is important for regional economic development poli-
cies. It should be stressed, however, that the presence of large multipliers is not, in itself, a
market failure, and therefore does not necessarily justify government intervention.
3.5 Some Empirical Evidence
The model presented in this Section appears to be general enough to capture many key
features of a realistic spatial equilibrium. To get a better sense of how well the model
describes the real world, I now review some of the empirical evidence on the assumptions
and the predictions of the model.34
One Type of Labor. The evidence in Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992),
and Davis, Loungani and Mahidhara (1997) is broadly consistent with the predictions of
the model with homogenous labor in section 3.1. These three papers aggregate all workers
into one group and ﬁnd substantial evidence of large labor ﬂows following permanent labor
demand shocks to a local labor market. Using state-level variation in demand conditions,
Blanchard and Katz (1992) ﬁnd that the main mechanism that re-establishes the equilibrium
after a demand shock appears to be labor mobility, rather than job creation or job migration.
Positive demand shocks are followed by substantial in-migration, while negative demand
shocks are followed by substantial out-migration, up to the point that the original equilibrium
between demand and supply is restored. In other words, these shocks have permanent eﬀects
on the size of labor markets. Blanchard and Katz (1992) estimate that it takes slightly less
than a decade for the aﬀected state to return to the initial equilibrium after a localized
shock. Bartik (1991) estimates suggest a somewhat slower adjustment. The diﬀerence is in
part due to the fact that the type of shocks examined by Bartik and Blanchard and Katz
34Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) argue that the assumption and the conclusions of the spatial equilibrium
model seem generally consistent with most ﬁrst order facts about the US labor and housing markets. For
example, geographic mobility in the US is signiﬁcant, with more than 40% of households changing addresses
every 5 years. Yet, Glaeser and Gottlieb note that ”there has been little tendency for people to move to
high income areas” even in the presence of large wage disparities across areas. However, they caution that
the fact that most amenities are hard to measure makes it inherently diﬃcult to test conclusively whether
the US labor market is indeed in a spatial equilibrium.
31is diﬀerent. Both papers focus on permanent shocks. However, Bartik’s estimates come
from a model where there is a ”once-and-for-all shock to local job growth, with subsequent
growth unchanged from what it would have been”. By contrast, Blanchard and Katz’s
estimates come from a model where the one-time shock to local job growth is allowed to
aﬀect subsequent job growth.
Overall, the ﬁndings in Blanchard and Katz (1992) on wages and housing prices are
consistent with the version of the spatial equilibrium model where both local labor supply
and housing supply are quite elastic in the long run. In particular, following a negative
shock, nominal wages decline in the short run, but go back to their original level in the long
run. Housing prices track changes in nominal wages, so that the decline in real wages is
limited.35
Topel (1986) generalizes the spatial equilibrium model to a dynamic setting. Consistent
with Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), Topel ﬁnds that positive shocks to
labor demand in a local labor market increase nominal wages there. But in addition to the
other two papers, Topel also ﬁnds that it is not just current shocks that matter for current
wages, but also expectations of future shocks. In particular, the expectation of a future
demand shock to a local labor market generates in-migration to that market and therefore
ultimately results in lower current nominal wages. An implication is that wages respond
more to transitory shocks to local labor markets than to permanent shocks.
More Than One Type of Labor Topel (1986) is among the ﬁrst to posit that mobility
costs could be diﬀerent across skill groups, with low-skilled workers having higher costs and
suggest that this diﬀerence may aﬀect the welfare incidence of demand shocks. Consistent
with a version of the model with heterogenous labor in Section 3.2 where the propensity to
move of unskilled workers is diﬀerent from the propensity to move of skilled workers, Topel
ﬁnds evidence of larger incidence of localized labor demand shocks on low-skilled workers
than on high skilled. In terms of the model this implies that sL > sH. Recall that the
parameter s characterizes the amount of worker preferences for location. A larger s implies
a lower elasticity of local labor supply and therefore lower labor mobility in response to
economic shocks.36
Bound and Holzer (2000) ﬁnd similar results. Using data on metropolitan areas, Bound
and Holzer separately quantify the eﬀects of location-speciﬁc labor demand shocks on the
labor market outcomes of skilled and unskilled workers. As in Blanchard and Katz, Bound
and Holzer (2000) ﬁnd that positive (negative) labor demand shocks are followed by labor
in-migration (out-migration). However, unskilled workers appear to be less sensitive to
possible arbitrage opportunities and therefore less mobile following good and bad shocks.
This diﬀerence in labor mobility has implications for the incidence of the shock. Because
35Additionally, Davis, Loungani and Mahidhara (1997) document that the speed of adjustment depends
on the exact source of the demand shock.
36Evidence in Machin, Pelkonen, and Salvanes (2009) and in Malamud and Wozniak (2009) indicates that
the diﬀerence in mobility rates between educated and less educated workers may be causal.
32of their stronger preferences for location, unskilled workers experience signiﬁcantly larger
declines in nominal and real wages following negative demand shocks than skilled workers.37
As a consequence, it appears that low skilled workers end up suﬀering more from localized
negative demand shocks than high-skilled workers because they see their real wages fall while
high-skilled workers move to better labor markets.
Notowidigdo (2010) proposes an alternative explanation for the diﬀerence in mobility
and incidence between high and low-skilled workers. He posits that low-skilled workers may
be shielded from local labor demand shocks because of declining house prices and public
assistance programs. Public assistance programs are naturally tilted towards low-skilled
workers. Housing price declines may also beneﬁt low-skilled workers more than high-skilled
workers if low-skilled workers have higher expenditure shares on housing. In this case, local
labor demand shocks have smaller incidence on low-skilled workers than high skilled workers.
Residents vs Movers. The spatial equilibrium model described above does a good job
of characterizing the incidence of demand or supply shocks to a local labor market, when
incidence is deﬁned as the share of the gains or losses that accrues to workers and landowners,
or the share that accrues to each city. However, the model is poorly equipped to deal with
the question of incidence when incidence is about which workers beneﬁt or lose: migrants
or original residents. For simplicity, my assumptions completely rule out any labor supply
responses by residents, thus forcing all the employment adjustment to come from mobility
in and out of the city. Moreover, the model is a full-employment model where involuntary
unemployment is ruled out. In reality, however, it is possible that residents may change the
amount of labor that they supply following local demand shocks.
The issue of who—between residents and migrants—ends up getting the new jobs cre-
ated by a positive labor demand shock is clearly important in the presence of involuntary
unemployment. This issue is particularly important when thinking about policies aimed at
increasing local employment, like local development policies. Implementing a local develop-
ment policy that increases employment in an area and beneﬁts only migrants from outside
the area is quite diﬀerent politically from implementing a local development policy that
beneﬁts residents. This is particularly true if the development policy is ﬁnanced by local
taxpayer money.
The literature disagrees on this point. On one hand, Renkow (2003, 2006) and Partridge,
Rickman and Li (2009) argue that the primary source of employment increases following
localized demand shocks comes from non-residents. The evidence in these studies, however,
37Bound and Holzer (2000) estimate that a 10% aggregate decline in labor demand in a city causes the
nominal wage of high-school and college graduates to decline in the long run by 7% and 4%, respectively. The
diﬀerence is even larger for younger workers. They also ﬁnd declines in real wages for both groups, although
smaller than the declines in nominal wages. These ﬁndings are qualitatively consistent with the estimates
in Blanchard and Katz (1992), but they require an elasticity of local labor supply that is lower than the one
implied by the estimates in Blanchard and Katz. Similarly, Topel (1986) ﬁnds large wage changes following
a localized shock for groups of workers with low mobility, and small wage changes for group of workers with
high mobility.
33is not particularly convincing and is far from conclusive. A more convincing set of empirical
studies is represented by Eberts and Stone (1992) and Bartik (1991, 2001). These studies
ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in the labor force participation of residents following localized labor
demand shocks. In a authoritative review of the literature, Bartik concludes that probably
25% of the new jobs are ﬁlled by increases in the labor force participation of local residents
in the long run, with the remaining 75% going to outsiders. In other words, three out of four
new jobs ”in a region are ﬁlled by persons who otherwise would not have lived there.”
4 The Determinants of Productivity Diﬀerences Across
Local Labor Markets
In Section 2, I documented the large and persistent diﬀerences in labor market outcomes
across metropolitan areas in the US. In Section 3, I clariﬁed how those diﬀerences can persist
in equilibrium in the long run, and who the ultimate beneﬁciaries of those diﬀerences are. In
that section, the focus is on the consequences of these diﬀerences, while the source of these
diﬀerences is taken as given. City b is assumed to be more productive than city a for some
exogenous reason and this higher productivity ultimately results in more population, higher
wages and higher housing costs.
In reality, however, most productivity diﬀerences within a country are unlikely to be
exogenous. In this section, I discuss what might determine productivity diﬀerences across
locations within a country. Economists have long hypothesized that the concentration of
economic activity may be explained by agglomeration economies of some kind. Agglomer-
ation of economic activity is particularly remarkable for industries that produce tradable
goods, because the areas where economic activity is concentrated are typically characterized
by high costs of labor and land. The observation that ﬁrms that produce tradable goods
locate in areas where economic activity is dense and labor and land costs are high is consis-
tent with the notion that those areas enjoy agglomeration advantages that oﬀset the higher
production costs.
I review the existing empirical evidence on agglomeration economies, focusing on two
related questions:
• What do we know about the magnitude of agglomeration economies? (section 4.1)
• What do we know about the micro mechanisms that generate agglomeration economies?
(section 4.2)
The past two decades have seen signiﬁcant amounts of eﬀort devoted to answering these
two questions. The key empirical challenge has been the possible existence of unobserved
features of localities that aﬀect ﬁrm productivity even in the absence of agglomeration
economies. The main conclusion of this section is that the existing literature has made
34some progress in empirically testing for the existence and quantifying the magnitude of ag-
glomeration economies, accounting for possible omitted variables. However, the channels
that generate these economies remain more elusive. Much remains to be done in terms of
empirically understanding the exact mechanisms that generate agglomerations of economic
activity.
The discussion in this section focuses on papers that might be of particular interest to
labor economists. See Duranton and Puga (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Glaeser
(2009) for recent surveys that are more focused on urban economics.
4.1 Empirical Estimates of Agglomeration Economies
Two empirical approaches have been proposed to test for and quantify agglomeration
economies. The ﬁrst approach is based on the equilibrium location decisions of ﬁrms and
seeks to infer the importance of agglomeration forces from the observed geographic distribu-
tion of employment. Empirically measuring the degree of agglomeration of diﬀerent localities
is not straightforward. Naive indexes of concentration are sensitive to heterogeneity in ﬁrm
size and in the size of the geographic areas for which data is available. In a landmark study,
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) propose a ”dartboard” style methodology for comparing the de-
gree of geographic concentration across industries, accounting for diﬀerences in ﬁrm size and
in the deﬁnition of geographic units. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms are spread quite unevenly across
localities. Almost all industries appear to be localized to some degree, although in many
industries, the degree of localization is not large. When industry is deﬁned at the two digit
level, high levels of concentration are observed in the tobacco, textile and leather industries.
Low levels of concentration are observed in the paper, rubber and plastics, and fabricated
metal products industries. In an important follow up, Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007)
use data from the Longitudinal Research Database to compute pairwise coagglomeration
measurements for manufacturing industries and relate these coagglomeration measurements
to industry characteristics. They document that coagglomeration rates are higher between
industries that are economically similar, suggesting that agglomeration advantages may de-
pend both on physical proximity and on economic linkages between ﬁrms. In a related study,
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) measure the extent of agglomeration by focusing on the lo-
calization decisions of new plants. In the presence of mobility frictions, the localization of
new plants is particularly informative because it is arguably less constrained by past local-
ization decisions. The empirical results are consistent with the notion that agglomeration
economies decline rapidly over space. Duranton and Overman (2005) propose an alternative
measure of agglomeration. Unlike the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) measure, the Duranton
and Overman measure is based on a continuous measure of distance and therefore does not
depend on arbitrary deﬁnitions of geographic units. Using data from the UK, they conﬁrm
35the existence of signiﬁcant amount of spatial agglomeration.38
While these dartboard tests are informative in quantifying agglomeration, the main chal-
lenge in interpreting these tests is that ﬁrms base their location decisions on where their
proﬁts are expected to be highest, and this could be due to spillovers, natural advantage, or
other unobserved cost shifters. The mere existence of agglomeration is not conclusive evi-
dence of agglomeration economies. A second approach to testing for agglomeration economies
directly asks whether productivity is higher in areas that are economically denser. An obvi-
ous diﬃculty is that productivity is an elusive quantity that is hard to measure empirically.
In practice, existing studies have used alternative measures of productivity, including output
per worker, wages and total factor productivity.
Using data on output per worker, Sveikauskas (1975) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) show
that increases in employment density in a location are correlated with signiﬁcant increases
in output per worker, although the lack of a solid identiﬁcation strategy precludes strong
conclusions about causality. In an inﬂuential paper, Glaeser and Mare’ (2001) use wages to
measure the marginal product of labor, and ask whether wages are higher in large urban
areas. Because they use a longitudinal dataset that follows workers over an extended period
of time, and some workers are observed moving in and out of urban areas, the authors are able
to account for permanent unobserved worker heterogeneity. Consistent with the existence of
agglomeration economies, Glaeser and Mare’ ﬁnd a signiﬁcant wage premium associated with
urban areas. The wage proﬁles of movers indicate that a signiﬁcant fraction of the urban
wage premium accrues to workers over time and stays with them when they leave cities.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that urban areas speed the accumulation of human
capital and that a signiﬁcant part of the urban wage premium is due to faster productivity
growth in urban areas. On the other hand, using French data, Combes et al. (2009) ﬁnd
evidence of signiﬁcant sorting of high ability workers into urban areas. Estimates of the
relationship between wages and density conditional on worker ﬁxed eﬀects are 50% smaller
than the unconditional relationship, indicating that at least half of the wage disparity across
French cities can be explained by worker quality.39
More recent work seeks to provide more direct evidence on the relationship between ag-
glomeration and productivity by testing whether total factor productivity at the ﬁrm level
is higher in denser areas. Studies in this group use longitudinal plant-level data to estimate
ﬁrm-level production functions and test whether changes over time in plant output are sys-
tematically associated with changes in the characteristics of the area around the plant, after
controlling for changes in inputs. Henderson (2003) and Moretti (2004) are early adopters of
this approach. In particular, Henderson (2003) estimates plant level production functions for
machinery and high-tech industries as a function of the density of other plants in the area,
both in the same industry and in diﬀerent industries. Identiﬁcation is based on the longitu-
38In particular, they ﬁnd that more than half of the 4-digit industries in the UK are characterized by a
degree of agglomeration that is statistically signiﬁcant.
39See also Wheaton and Lewis (2002).
36dinal nature of the data. He ﬁnds that in the high-tech sector the number of establishments
in an industry is positively associated with productivity, although this association is small
for the machinery industry. As expected, this association is stronger for plants belonging to
single-establishment ﬁrms than for plants that belong to multi-establishment ﬁrms.
More recently, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (forthcoming) provide direct estimates
of the magnitude of agglomeration economies by comparing the eﬀect of attracting a new
manufacturing establishment on the productivity of existing manufacturing establishments in
a county. They propose a novel identiﬁcation strategy that relies not just on the longitudinal
nature of the data but also on reported location rankings of proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms to
identify a valid counterfactual for what would have happened to the incumbent plants’
productivity in the absence of the plant opening. Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti ﬁnd
that attracting a new manufacturing establishment to a county results in substantial increases
in productivity for existing establishments in that county. Figure 7 replicates their Figure
1 and shows that ﬁve years after the new plant opened, incumbent plants experienced a
12% relative increase in TFP. Consistent with the spatial equilibrium model in Section
3, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (forthcoming) ﬁnd that the increased productivity
enjoyed by existing plants comes at a cost, as quality-adjusted labor costs increase. As
argued in Section 3, this increase is consistent with an upward sloping local supply of labor
or an upward sloping supply of housing. Since manufacturing ﬁrms produce nationally traded
goods and cannot raise output prices in response to higher input prices, the ultimate increase
in proﬁts experienced by incumbents is smaller than the productivity increase.
A notable feature of the spatial distribution of economic activity is represented by indus-
try clustering, whereby ﬁrms tend to cluster near other ”similar” ﬁrms (for example: ﬁrms
that sell similar products). The cluster of IT ﬁrms in Silicon Valley, biomedical research in
Boston, biotech in San Diego and San Francisco, ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Wall Street and London
are notable examples. The ﬁndings in Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti have interesting
implications for explaining the existence and persistence of industrial clusters. The estimated
productivity spillover appears to increase with various measures of economic proximity be-
tween the new plant and the incumbent plant. Because the documented increase in labor
costs applies to all ﬁrms in the aﬀected county, while the magnitude of the documented
productivity spillovers is larger for pairs of plants that are economically closer, incumbent
ﬁrms that are economically further away from other ﬁrms should become less proﬁtable over
time. In the long run, this process may result in increased agglomeration of similar plants
in each location.
Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) estimate the eﬀect on the productivity of Manhattan ad-
vertising agencies of locating near other advertising agencies. Consistent with the model
proposed by Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), they ﬁnd agglomeration economies charac-
terized by extremely rapid spatial decay. Moreover, consistent with the spatial equilibrium
model, the beneﬁt of agglomeration appears to be at least partially oﬀset by higher land
prices. In this industry, physical proximity appears to be beneﬁcial because it facilitates net-
37working. Interestingly, the magnitude of the productivity spillover appears to vary with ﬁrm
quality, with higher quality agencies beneﬁtting more from networking than lower quality
agencies.
Of course, not every productivity spillover is necessarily a market failure that requires
government intervention. Spillovers that occur within a ﬁrm, for example, can be in principle
internalized. Mas and Moretti (2008) explore how the productivity of a worker varies as a
function of the productivity of her co-workers and ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant within-ﬁrm
productivity spillovers. The introduction of a high productivity worker in a shift signiﬁcantly
raises the productivity of her co-workers. In particular, substituting a worker with above
average permanent productivity for a worker with below average permanent productivity is
associated with a 1% increase in the eﬀort of other workers on the same shift. While low
productivity workers beneﬁt from the presence of more capable workers, the productivity
of high-skilled workers is not hurt by the presence of low-skilled co-workers. This type of
spillover could be internalized by the ﬁrm by raising the salary of highly productive workers
to reﬂect their external beneﬁt on the productivity of less productive workers.
While signiﬁcant progress has been made in estimating agglomeration economies using
plausible identifying assumptions, some authors have raised the concern that the observed
higher productivity in dense areas may reﬂect selection due to increased competition. For
example, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a framework where the presence of a larger
number of ﬁrms in larger markets increases competition and this ultimately causes less
eﬃcient ﬁrms to disappear. While this argument may apply to countries, it seems less obvious
that it should apply to cities within a country. Within a country, ﬁrms in the tradable sector
compete with ﬁrms in other cities, so it seems unlikely that local concentration oﬀers a good
measure of the relevant degree of competition. Indeed, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga
and Roux (2009) provide recent convincing evidence in support this observation.40
4.2 Explanations of Agglomeration Economies
Understanding the ultimate causes of agglomeration economies is crucial to understand-
ing persistent labor market diﬀerences across metropolitan areas. It is also very important
for policy, as I discuss in Section 5. Here, I review the theory and the evidence on the
three most relevant explanations that have been proposed for the agglomeration of eco-
nomic activity: (1) advantages deriving from thick labor markets; (2) advantages deriving
from proximity to providers of intermediate non-tradable goods and services; (3) localized
knowledge spillovers.41
40They use a generalization of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model to distinguish between agglomeration
economies and ﬁrm selection. Using French data on manufacturing establishments, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms in
large cities are more productive than ﬁrms in small cities, but ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the amount of selection
between small and large cities.
41Other explanations have been proposed for agglomeration economies, but they seem to be less relevant
than the three described above. Some concentration of economic activity may be explained by the presence
384.2.1 Thick Labor Markets
Thick markets have long been understood to be more attractive than thin markets when
frictions of some type separate demand from supply. For example, in the inﬂuential barter
model by Diamond (1982), the probability of ﬁnding a trading partner depends on the
number of potential partners available, so that an increase in the thickness of the market
makes trade easier. This generates multiple steady state equilibria and, in each of them, the
equilibrium level of production is not eﬃcient. In the context of local labor markets, there
are two reasons why workers and ﬁrms may ﬁnd thick labor markets in large metropolitan
areas attractive: better matches and lower risk.42
First, in the presence of worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity, a worker-ﬁrm match may be more
productive in areas where there are many ﬁrms oﬀering jobs and many workers looking for
jobs. The higher quality of the worker-ﬁrm match in thicker labor markets may result in
higher productivity and higher wages. This notion was ﬁrst formalized twenty years ago
in a model by Helsley and Strange (1990). Acemoglu (1997) and Rotemberg and Saloner
(2000) propose variants of this hypothesis. In Acemoglu’s model, employers in thick labor
markets invest in new technologies because they know they can ﬁnd specialized employees.
At the same time, employees in thick markets invest in human capital because they know
that when they change jobs, their human capital will be valued. Rotemberg and Saloner
capture a similar idea in a model with multiple cities with identical factor endowments. In
their setting, agglomeration of production is caused by the fact that having more competition
between ﬁrms to hire skilled workers makes it easier for skilled workers to recoup the cost of
acquiring industry-speciﬁc human capital.
Note that the relevant deﬁnition of labor market thickness is likely to depend not just
on the size of a metropolitan area, but also on the skill set of a given worker. Two workers
with diﬀerent skills living in the same metropolitan areas may be exposed to vastly diﬀerent
labor market thickness. For example, a bioengineer and an architect living in the same city
may face diﬀerent market thickness, depending on the local agglomeration of bioengineering
ﬁrms and architectural ﬁrms.
A second potential beneﬁt of thick labor markets is the provision of insurance to workers
and ﬁrms against idiosyncratic shocks. Thick labor markets reduce the probability that a
worker remains unemployed following an idiosyncratic negative product demand shock to her
of natural advantages that constrain speciﬁc productions to speciﬁc locations. In practice, while natural
advantages may be important in some industries, they are unlikely to be important determinants of agglom-
eration in most industries. In an often cited paper, Ellison and Glaeser (1999) show that natural advantages
matter in some cases, but they account for only 20% of the observed degree of agglomeration. Historically,
proximity of ﬁrms to consumers might also have played a role in the agglomeration of economic activity in
metropolitan areas (Krugman, 1991). In practice, however, the substantial decline in transportation costs
makes this explanation less relevant for most industries at the present time. Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004)
calculate that the cost of moving goods by rail or trucking has declined more than 90 percent over the last
century.
42Labor market pooling externalities were ﬁrst proposed by Marshall (1890).
39employer. The presence of a large number of other employers implies a lower probability of
not ﬁnding another job. At the same time, thick labor markets reduce the probability that a
ﬁrm can’t ﬁll a vacancy, following an idiosyncratic shock to the labor supply of an employee.
The presence of a large number of workers ensures a lower probability of not ﬁnding another
worker. As in the case of match quality, this argument applies particularly to workers with
specialized skills.
These two versions of the thick labor market hypothesis have diﬀerent empirical impli-
cations. If the size of the labor market leads to better worker-ﬁrm matches, we should see
that ﬁrms located in denser areas are more productive than otherwise identical ﬁrms lo-
cated in less dense areas. The fact that the size of the labor market leads to a lower risk of
unemployment for workers and a lower risk of unﬁlled vacancies for ﬁrms, does not imply
diﬀerences in productivity between dense and less dense areas, but diﬀerences in wages. The
sign of these wage diﬀerences is unclear a priori, because it depends on the magnitude of
the compensating diﬀerential that workers are willing to pay for lower risk of unemployment
(generated by an increase in labor supply in denser areas) relative to the cost savings that
ﬁrms experience due to lower risk of unﬁlled vacancies (generated by an increase in labor
demand in denser areas). The former can be thought of as an increase in labor demand in
thicker markets, while the latter can be tought of as an increase in labor supply in thicker
markets.
Although the idea that thick labor market are beneﬁcial is an old one, the existing
empirical evidence is still limited. This is due in part to the fact that the quality of a
worker-ﬁrm match has proven diﬃcult to measure in practice.43 Using a semi-structural
model of the labor market, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide one of the earliest tests
of the scale eﬀect in job search based on the comparison of the number of job matches in
labor markets of diﬀerent sizes. The idea of the test is very simple. If the total number of
vacancies and unemployed workers in a city is twice as large as the total number of vacancies
and unemployed workers in another city, we should see that the number of matches per
unit of time in the former city is more than twice as large the number of matches in the
latter. Using British data, Petrongolo and Pissarides compare the oﬀer arrival rate and
the wage oﬀer distribution in London (a thick labor market) with the rest of the country.
They ﬁnd signiﬁcant scale eﬀects in wage oﬀers, but not in actual matches. However, the
lack of observed scale eﬀects in matches could in part be explained if the reservation wage
endogenously adjusts to the size of the market.
A second piece of empirical evidence has to do with the relationship between frequency
of job changes and size of the labor market. Wheeler (2005) and Bleakly and Lin (2006) ﬁnd
evidence that, although indirect, is generally consistent with localized increasing returns to
scale in matching. In particular, using longitudinal data from the NLSY, Wheeler (2005)
documents that the probability of changing industry is positively correlated with the size of
43In this respect, Puga (2009) argues that ”the increasing availability of matched employer employee
microdata will encourage more work on agglomeration through matching.”
40the labor market for young workers and negatively associated with the size of the labor
market for older workers. Bleakly and Lin (2006) ﬁnd similar results for industry and
occupation changes using cross-sectional data from the Census. They also ﬁnd that this
pattern remains true even in the case of involuntary separations. In other words, early
in a career, when presumably workers are shopping around for a good match, industry and
occupation changes occur more often in large, diverse local markets than in small, specialized
ones. Later in a career, when changing industry or occupation becomes more costly because
it may involve giving up specialized skills, industry and occupation changes occur less often
in large markets, presumably because matches are better. The existing evidence, while
generally consistent with the notion that larger labor markets facilitate matching, is still
indirect. A more direct test might involve the duration of the match, as a measure of the
quality of the match (Jovanovic, 1979). A testable implication is that job duration should
be longer in larger labor markets than in smaller markets.
An additional testable implication of this hypothesis is that the productivity beneﬁt of
thick labor markets should be particularly important for industries that rely on specialized
labor. Consider, for example, a digital media software engineer. If digital media ﬁrms have
heterogeneous technologies, and digital media software engineers have heterogenous skills, it
is likely that the the match between a worker’s speciﬁc skills and a ﬁrm’s speciﬁc technology
is more productive in a city where there are many digital media ﬁrms than in a city where
there is only one digital media ﬁrm.44 By contrast, the thickness of the labor market may not
signiﬁcantly improve the match quality and the productivity of less specialized workers in the
same city, like manual laborers. An empirical test could involve estimating the diﬀerence in
the correlation between measures of match quality (for example, wages and job duration) and
market size, for workers who live in the same city but have diﬀerent skill levels (specialized
vs non specialized) and work in diﬀerent industries (locally agglomerated vs locally non-
agglomerated).
Fallick et al. (2006) posit that in high-tech industry clusters like Silicon Valley, high job
mobility may facilitate the reallocation of resources towards ﬁrms with superior innovations,
but it may also create human capital externalities that reduce incentives to invest in new
knowledge. They argue that in the computer industry, the innovation beneﬁts of job-hopping
exceed the costs from reduced incentives to invest in human capital, while in other parts of
the high-tech sector the opposite might be true. Their evidence is consistent with this notion,
but it is too indirect to be deﬁnitive.45
The evidence in Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (forthcoming) also is consistent with
44Indirect support for this hypothesis can be found in Baumgardner (1988), who ﬁnds that doctors perform
a narrower and more specialized set of activities in large metropolitan areas than in small metropolitan areas.
45Andersson et al (2007) show that thicker urban labor markets are associated with more assortative
matching between workers and ﬁrms and argue that production complementarity and assortative matching
are important sources of the urban productivity premium. Using a matched employer-employee database for
Italy, Mion and Naticchioni (2009) also ﬁnd important amount of assortative matching.
41the notion that spillovers occur between ﬁrms that share a similar worker pool. The mag-
nitude of the productivity spillovers that they uncover depends on the economic linkages
between the new plant and the incumbent plant. In their data, spillovers are larger for pairs
of ﬁrms that belong to industries that share the same set of workers. This lends credibility
to the notion that labor market pooling is an important source of agglomeration economies.
Costa and Kahn (2000) point out that thick labor markets are particularly important for
dual career households, because thick labor markets may solve the co-location problem. The
economic return of being in a large labor market relative to a small market is increasing over
time and Costa and Kahn attribute at least half of the increased agglomeration of skilled
workers in large cities to the growing severity of the co-location problem.
In his inﬂuential book on economic geography, Krugman (1991) proposes an alternative
version of the thick labor market hypothesis. He argues that an advantage of thick labor
markets is that idiosyncratic demand shocks to ﬁrms are less likely to aﬀect equilibrium
wages. To see why it may matter, consider a ﬁrm experiencing an idiosyncratic positive
productivity shock. If the labor market is thick, this ﬁrm faces a relatively ﬂat supply of
labor. If the labor market is thin, the ﬁrm faces an upward sloping supply of labor and the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock may ultimately result in higher labor costs. Consistent with this hypoth-
esis, Overman and Puga (2009) show that industries characterized by more idiosyncratic
volatility are more spatially concentrated.
In sum, thickness of the labor market is a potentially promising explanation for the
agglomeration of economic activity in metropolitan areas. It is highly plausible that workers
prefer to be in areas with thick labor markets because of an increased probability of a better
match with an employer and a reduction in the probability of unemployment. At the same
time, it is also highly plausible that ﬁrms prefer to be in areas with thick labor markets
because of an increased probability of a better match with an employee and a reduction
in the probability of unﬁlled vacancies. While intriguing, most of the existing empirical
evidence is still quite indirect. This clearly is an area that should receive increased attention
by labor economists in the years to come.
4.2.2 Thick Market for Intermediate Inputs
A second possible explanation for agglomeration economies centers on the availability
of specialized intermediate inputs. Concentration of specialized industrial production can
support the production of nontradable specialized inputs. The agglomeration economy in
this case is generated by the sharing of inputs whose production is characterized by internal
increasing returns to scale. This explanation is likely to be particularly relevant for ﬁrms
that utilize intermediate inputs that are both highly specialized and non-tradable. Consider,
for example, an industry where production crucially depends on the availability of special-
ized local producer services, such as specialized repair services, engineering services, venture
capital ﬁnancing, specialized legal support, or specialized shipping services. To the extent
42that these services are non-tradable—or are costly to deliver to distant clients—new entrants
in this industry have an incentive to locate near other incumbents. By clustering near other
similar ﬁrms, entrants can take advantage of an existing network of intermediate inputs sup-
pliers. In equilibrium, cheaper, faster or more specialized supply of intermediate goods and
services makes industrial clusters attractive to ﬁrms, further increasing the agglomeration.
This concentration process will go on up to the point where the increase in land costs oﬀsets
the beneﬁts of agglomeration.
While this idea has been around for a long time, the ﬁrst to formalize it are Abdel-Rahman
and Fujita (1990), who propose a model where ﬁnal goods are tradable, but intermediate
inputs are non-tradable and are produced by a monopolistically competitive industry. In
the model, ﬁrms that locate in dense areas share a larger and wider pool of intermediate
inputs suppliers, while otherwise similar ﬁrms that locate in rural areas share a smaller
and narrower pool of intermediate inputs suppliers. This diﬀerence generates agglomeration
advantages because an increase in the number of ﬁrms in an area results in a wider local
supply of inputs and therefore in an increase in productivity.
The evidence in Holmes (1999) oﬀers direct support for the input sharing hypothesis. Us-
ing data on manufacturing plants, he documents that manufacturing establishments located
is areas with many other establishments in the same industry make more intensive use of
purchased intermediate inputs than otherwise similar manufacturing establishments in areas
with fewer establishments in the same industry. Notably, this relationship only holds among
industries that are geographically concentrated. Spatial proximity has limited impact on
geographically dispersed industries.
Building on an idea ﬁrst proposed by Rosenthal and Strange (2001), Overman and Puga
(2009) provide an alternative test of this hypothesis by relating measures of geographic
concentration for each industry to industry-speciﬁc measures of the importance of input
sharing. They ﬁnd support for the notion that the availability of locally supplied inputs is
an important empirical determinant of industrial clusters.
Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2007) propose an alternative approach to the one taken by
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Overman and Puga (2009). They seek to understand the
mechanics of the agglomeration process by focusing on how industries are coagglomerated.
Diﬀerent agglomeration theories have diﬀerent predictions about which pairs of industries
should coagglomerate. For example, if input markets are important, then ﬁrms in an indus-
try should be observed to locate near industries that are their suppliers. On the other hand,
if labor market pooling is important, then industries should locate near other industries that
employ the same type of labor. Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr ﬁnd evidence that input-output
dependencies, labor pooling and knowledge spillovers are all signiﬁcant determinants of ag-
glomeration, but input-output dependencies appear to be empirically the most important
channel.
434.2.3 Knowledge Spillovers
Economists have long speculated that the agglomeration of human capital may generate
positive spillovers, over and above its private eﬀect.46 Diﬀerent explanations have been
oﬀered for such spillovers. For example, physical proximity with educated workers may lead
to better sharing of ideas, faster innovation or faster technology adoption. Perhaps the most
inﬂuential theoretical contribution in this area is the model by Lucas (1988). In that paper,
human capital is assumed to have two eﬀects. First, an individual’s own human capital has
the standard eﬀect of increasing her own productivity. Second, the average aggregate level
of human capital contributes to the productivity of all factors of production. This second
eﬀect is an externality, because “though all beneﬁt from it, no individual human capital
accumulation decision can have an appreciable eﬀect on average human capital, so no one
will take it into account” in deciding how much to invest in human capital accumulation. In
Lucas’ view, human capital externalities may be large enough to explain long–run income
diﬀerences between rich and poor countries. While in the model the externality is simply built
into the production function in black-box fashion, Lucas posits that the sharing of knowledge
and skills through formal and informal interaction may be the mechanism that generates the
externality. More recent models build on this idea by assuming that individuals augment
their human capital through pairwise meetings with more skilled neighbors at which they
exchange ideas. Examples include Glaeser (1999),47 Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Black and
Henderson (1999), Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), Duranton and Puga (2001) and
Saxenian (1994). Important earlier contributions are Arrow (1979) and Griliches (1962).48
A second class of models explains positive human capital externalities as pecuniary ex-
ternalities that arise because of search or endogenous skill–biased technical change. Consider
for example the case proposed by Acemoglu (1994), where job search is costly, and physi-
cal and human capital are complements. The privately optimal amount of human capital
depends on the amount of physical capital a worker expects to use. The privately optimal
amount of physical capital depends on the supply of human capital. If a group of workers
in a city increases its level of education, ﬁrms in that city, expecting to employ these work-
ers, would invest more in physical capital. Since search is costly, some of the workers who
46This question has important implications for education policies. The magnitude of the social return to
education is important for assessing the eﬃciency of public investment in education.
47Glaeser (1999) argues that young workers move to cities because interactions with experienced workers
help them increase their human capital.
48Of course, it is also possible that human capital externalities are negative. If education functions as a
signal of productive ability, rather than enhancing productivity directly, the private return may exceed the
social return. This is a case where people with higher innate ability signal their higher innate productivity by
enduring extra years of schooling. If schooling is more diﬃcult for individuals with low innate productivity
than for individuals with high innate productivity, then, even if schooling itself is worthless in terms of
enhancing productivity, it still may be a useful screening device for employers to identify more productive
job applicants. In this case, increasing the average schooling in a city would result in an increase in aggregate
earnings that is smaller than the private return to schooling.
44have not increased their education would end up working with more physical capital and
hence earn more than similar workers in other cities. As in Lucas, the presence of skilled
workers in a city generates external beneﬁts for other workers there. But what distinguishes
Acemoglu’s story from Lucas’ story is that this result does not follow from assumptions
on the production function, but rather is derived from market interactions. Even though
all the production functions of the economy exhibit constant returns to scale in Acemoglu,
the complementarity of human capital and physical capital coupled with frictions in the job
search process, generate a positive relationship between the average wage and average human
capital, holding constant workers’ individual human capital.49
There is growing empirical evidence that human capital spillovers and knowledge spillovers
may be particularly important in certain high-tech industries, where innovation has been
shown to be linked to human capital externalities. Because human capital spillovers and
knowledge spillovers are invisible, most empirical studies resort to indirect evidence to test
for the presence of spillovers. Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) are an exception, in
that they provide direct evidence of spillovers using a ”paper trail” based on patent citations
to test the extent to which knowledge spillovers are geographically localized. Because patents
are publicly available, in the absence of localized spillovers, citations should not depend on
the location of the inventor. The key empirical challenge of the paper is to distinguish be-
tween geographic patterns of patent citations caused by spillovers from patterns caused by
other sources of agglomeration eﬀects. To address this issue, the authors construct “con-
trol” samples of patents that have the same temporal and technological distribution as the
patent citations and compare the two patterns of geographic concentration. They ﬁnd that
references to existing patents that inventors include in their patent applications are likely to
come from the same state or metropolitan area as the originating patent application. They
conclude that patent citations are geographically localized and that knowledge spillovers
appear to be large.
In a related study, Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) argue that the presence of specialized
human capital is the main determinant of the localization of biotechnology ﬁrms in the US.
They show that the stock of human capital of scientists in certain cities—measured in terms
of the number of publications reporting genetic–sequence discoveries in academic journals—
is correlated with the location of new biotech ﬁrms. This eﬀect may reﬂect, at least in part,
human capital externalities, because it is not just a reﬂection of the presence of universities
and government research centers in areas where outstanding scientists are located. the
49Although diﬀerences across cities in their quantity of physical capital play a central role in this model,
diﬀerences in the quality of physical capital (technology) could arguably generate similar conclusions. Specif-
ically, if skills and technology are complementary, it is plausible to assume that the privately optimal amount
of human capital depends not only on the amount of physical capital a worker expects to use, but also on
the technological level that characterizes such capital. Similarly, in models with endogenous skill–biased
technical change, an increase in the supply of educated workers increases the size of the market for skill-
complementary technologies and stimulates the R&D sector to spend more eﬀort upgrading the productivity
of skilled workers (Acemoglu, 1998).
45introduction of new products—spatially clusters more in industries where new knowledge
plays a more important role, holding constant the degree of spatial clustering of economic
activity.50 In recent work, Carlino et al. (2009) use patents to measure innovation, and ﬁnd
that the number of patents per capita is positively correlated to the density of employment
in the highly urbanized portion of metropolitnan areas. A city with twice the employment
density of another city has 20% more patents per capita. Local human capital appears to be
the most important predictor of per capita rates of patenting. However, due to the absence
of a credible research design, this study fails to establish causality.
These earlier studies are consistent with the notion that knowledge spillovers may be
important in a limited number of high-tech or high-skill industries. More recent studies seek
to provide more general—and often better identiﬁed—tests for human capital spillovers.
Using estimates of establishment–level production functions, Moretti (2004a) shows that
manufacturing plants are signiﬁcantly more productive in cities with higher human capital,
holding constant individual plant human capital. The magnitude of spillovers between plants
in the same city declines in economic distance as in Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti
(forthcoming). Much of the estimated spillover comes from high–tech plants. For non high–
tech producers, the spillover appears to be limited. Consistent with the predictions of the
spatial equilibrium model, the productivity gains uncovered by Moretti appear to be oﬀset by
increased labor costs. The estimated productivity diﬀerences between cities with high human
capital and low human capital are similar to observed diﬀerences in wages of manufacturing
workers, indicating an almost complete oﬀset. While the documented productivity gains
from human capital spillovers are statistically and economically meaningful, the implied
contribution of human capital spillovers to economic growth does not appear to be large.
Moretti estimates that human capital spillovers were responsible for an average of a 0.1%
increase in output per year during the 1980s.51
A recent paper by Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008) proposes a hypothesis that may
potentially explain Moretti’s ﬁndings. They argue that over the past 30 years, technological
change resulted in increases in the productivity of skilled workers in cities that had many
educated workers. The estimates support the idea that diﬀerences in technology use across
50On the other hand, the exact magnitude of the spillovers is still debated. Audretsch and Stephan (1996)
use data on the IPO’s of biotech ﬁrms to link the location of the biotechnology ﬁrm with the location
of the university-based scientists aﬃliated with the ﬁrm. They conclude that ”while proximity matters
in establishing formal ties between university-based scientists and companies, its inﬂuence is anything but
overwhelming”. In earlier work, Adams and Jaﬀe (1989) study the composition of the knowledge transfers
within and across ﬁrms. They use manufacturing plant–level data to examine the productivity eﬀects of
R&D performed in a plant, outside a plant but inside the parent ﬁrm that owns the plant, and in external
plants in the same geographic area or industry. They ﬁnd that R&D of other ﬁrms in the same industry is
correlated with a plant’s own productivity, holding industry constant. However, identiﬁcation is based on
questionable assumptions and the potential for omitted variable bias makes it hard to draw ﬁrm conclusions
about causality.
51Glaeser and Scheinkman (1995) report that income per capita has grown faster in cities with high initial
human capital in the post-war period.
46cities (measured by the adoption of computers) and its eﬀects on wages reﬂect an equilib-
rium response to local factor supply conditions. In particular, cities initially endowed with
relatively abundant and cheap skilled labor adopted computers more aggressively than cities
with relatively expensive skilled labor, causing returns to skill to increase most in cities that
adopted computers most intensively.
A growing number of studies focus on the eﬀect of aggregate human capital on earn-
ings. A simple framework indicates that increases in the aggregate level of human capital
in a city have two distinct eﬀects on wages. First, imperfect substitution between educated
and uneducated workers indicates that an increase in the number of educated workers will
lower the wage of the educated and raise the wage of uneducated workers. Second, human
capital spillovers may raise the wage of both groups. Imperfect substitution and spillovers
both increase wages of uneducated workers, while the impact of an increase in the supply
of educated workers on their own wage is determined by two competing forces: the ﬁrst
is the conventional supply eﬀect which makes the economy move along a downward slop-
ing demand curve; the second is the spillover that raises productivity. Using metropolitan
areas as a deﬁnition of local labor markets, Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004b), among oth-
ers, document that wages are signiﬁcantly higher in metropolitan areas with higher human
capital, holding constant individual worker human capital. In particular, consistent with a
model that includes both conventional demand and supply factors as well as human capi-
tal spillovers, Moretti ﬁnds that a one percentage point increase in the labor force share of
college graduates increases the wages of high-school drop-outs, high-school graduates and
college graduates by 1.9%, 1.6% and 0.4%, respectively. Using states as a deﬁnition of lo-
cal labor markets, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) fail to ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of human
capital spillovers. A possible explanation of this diﬀerence is the evidence in recent work by
Rosenthal and Strange (2008). They ﬁnd that proximity to college graduates is associated
with increases in wages but that these eﬀects attenuate sharply with distance. If this is the
case, it is possible that states are too large of geographic units to allow for the detection of
human capital spillovers.52
The ﬁndings in Glaeser and Mare’ (2001) described above are consistent with a model
where individuals acquire skills by interacting with one another, and dense urban areas
increase the probability of interaction. In a related paper, Peri (2002) shows that young
educated workers receive a lower wage premium in urban areas than their old educated
workers, but in spite of this, young educated workers are overrepresented in urban areas.
Peri argues that learning externalities are an important explanation. Workers learn from
each other when they are young, so living in dense urban areas may raise human capital
accumulation more than living in a rural area. The negative compensating diﬀerential in-
52Additionally, Acemoglu and Angrist estimate spillovers coming from high school graduation. On the
contrary, Moretti and Rosenthal and Strage identify spillovers coming from variation in college graduation.
It is possible that an increase in the number of those who ﬁnish high-school has a diﬀerent external eﬀect
than an increase in the number of those who go to college.
47dicates that young workers value such human capital externalities. As they grow older, the
importance of knowledge spillovers diminishes, and some of them move toward non–urban
areas.
Some studies have posited that areas with a more educated populace are more likely to
generate new business ideas and new ﬁrms. This is not a market failure. However, if skilled
people are more likely to innovate in ways that employ other skilled people, this creates
an agglomeration economy where skilled people want to be around each other. Berry and
Glaeser (2005) present evidence consistent with a model of urban agglomeration where the
number of entrepreneurs is a function of the number of skilled people working in an area.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Doms, Lewis and Robb (2009) use a new panel of startup
ﬁrms to show that areas that possess more skilled labor also possess higher rates of self-
employment and more skilled entrepreneurs. Moreover, conditional on owner’s education,
higher education levels in the local market are positively correlated with improved business
outcomes.
5 Implications for Policy
The empirical evidence surveyed in Section 4 points to the concrete possibility that ag-
glomeration of economic activity generates signiﬁcant economies of scale at the local level.
It is therefore natural to raise the question of the desirability of government intervention. In
a world with vast disparities in income levels across localities and with signiﬁcant agglom-
eration externalities, what is the proper role of economic policy? Should national or local
governments provide subsidies to ﬁrms to locate in their jurisdiction?
In this section, I discuss the economic rationales for location-based policies. I deﬁne
location-based policies as government interventions aimed at reallocating resources from one
location to another location. These policies are widespread both in the US and in the rest
of the world. In the US, state and local governments spend $30-40 billion per year on
these policies, while the federal government spends $8-12 billion (Bartik, 2002). Examples
of location-based policies typically adopted by local and state governments include direct
subsidies and/or tax incentives for local ﬁrms, subsidized loans, industrial parks, technology
transfer programs, export assistance and export ﬁnancing, the provision of infrastructure,
workforce training, subsidies to higher education and area marketing. Bartik (1991) provides
a comprehensive taxonomy and discussion of the diﬀerent types of policies. More generally,
states and cities compete based on income and corporate tax rates, labor and environmen-
tal regulations, and many other forms of intervention that aﬀect the relative proﬁtability
for ﬁrms of locating in each jurisdiction. The US federal government also promotes sev-
eral location-based policies. The Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional
Commission are important historical examples of large federal programs that target poor
rural areas for development aid. A more recent example is the Federal Empowerment Zones
48Program, which is a system of subsidies for businesses located in poor urban neighborhoods.
Location-based policies are also widespread in Europe in the form of European Union regional
transfers; and in Asia, in the form of special economic zones.53
In general, economists think that there are two possible rationales for government inter-
vention in the economy: equity and eﬃciency. Location-based policies are no exception. I
begin in Section 5.1 by discussing several aspects of the equity rationale. In Section 5.2, I
turn to the eﬃciency rationale. Bartik (1991 and 2002) and Glaeser and Gottleib (2008) pro-
vide authoritative discussions of the economic rationales for local subsidies with somewhat
diﬀering conclusions on their desirability.54
5.1 Equity Considerations
5.1.1 Incidence of Subsidies
It is tempting for policymakers to support policies intended to help disadvantaged ar-
eas. The main argument in favor of these policies is that by helping disadvantaged areas,
the government helps disadvantaged individuals. The spatial equilibrium model outlined in
Section 3 suggests that this argument is at least in part ﬂawed, since the poor are unlikely
to fully capture the beneﬁts of location-based subsidies. In a world where workers are mo-
bile, targeting locations instead of individuals is an ineﬀective way of helping disadvantaged
individuals.
To see this more concretely, I consider ﬁrst the case where subsidies for ﬁrms to locate in
a given locality are ﬁnanced by the central government, and then the case where subsidies
are ﬁnanced locally.
(a) Centrally Financed Subsidies. Consider a location-based redistributive policy
intended to help disadvantaged areas. Assume for example that the central government
taxes residents of areas with high (nominal) income to provide subsidies to ﬁrms to locate in
areas with low (nominal) income. Most countries have these types of redistributive policies.
An example of this policy in the US is the Empowerment Zones Program mentioned above.
Another example is represented by the ubiquitous state policies designed to attract businesses
to poor parts of their jurisdiction. In Canada, an equalization program transfers income
from high income provinces to low income provinces. The European Union has a similar
53A prominent example of the latter is the successful program adopted by the government of Taiwan to
subsidize R&D in semi-conductors and other high-tech ﬁelds.
54Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Goolsbee and Maydew (2002), Faulk (2002), Bennmarker, Gelge Mellander
and Bjorn (2009) Bondonio and Engberg (2000), Peters and Fisher (2002), Greenstone and Moretti (2004),
Hornbeck, Greenstone and Moretti (forthcoming) provide recent estimates of the employment eﬀects of local
subsidies. The last two papers have a discussion of the policy implications of these subsidies. Work by Bartik
(1991, 1993) and Papke (1993, 1994) represent important early contributions that helped to frame the policy
debate on location-based policies in economic terms. See also Wasylenko (1997).
49transfer program aimed at transferring EU development funds to regions with below average
income.55
The incidence of this policy and its redistributive implications ultimately depend on the
elasticity of local labor supply and housing supply. Section 3 clariﬁes that if workers are
highly mobile, they will arbitrage some or all of the beneﬁts associated with this transfer by
relocating to the area favored by the transfer, thus bidding up the price of housing. In the case
of high elasticity of local labor supply and less than inﬁnite elasticity of housing supply, this
increase in housing prices will oﬀset most of the welfare gains that might otherwise accrue to
existing residents.56 In the extreme case of perfect mobility, increases in the price of housing
fully oﬀset the transfer. In this setting, location-based redistributive policies intended to
help areas with low nominal income have virtually no eﬀect on the utility of workers. The
only beneﬁciaries of this policy are landowners in the targeted areas. Eﬀectively, this policy
amounts to a transfer of wealth from landowners in the rest of the country to landowners in
the targeted areas. If the theoretical model is a fair approximation of the real world, then
its basic premises cast considerable doubt on the desirability of redistributing income from
areas with high income to areas with low income.57
How does this conclusion change if labor is not highly mobile? The model in section
3 indicates that if individuals have signiﬁcant preferences over speciﬁc locations, labor is
less mobile. In this case, the marginal worker is indiﬀerent across locations, but the average
worker is not and location-based redistributive policies have the potential to aﬀect the utility
of the average worker. In particular, inframarginal workers in rich areas experience an
increase in taxes and a decrease in the cost of living, while inframarginal workers in poor
areas experience an increase in transfers and an increase in the cost of living. Overall,
the redistributive eﬀect is complicated and unlikely to be clear ex-ante, because it crucially
depends on individual preferences for location, which are unlikely to be observed by policy
makers. This lack of observability makes it diﬃcult to implement policies of this type in
practice.
Busso, Gregory and Kline (2009) provide the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical welfare analy-
sis of a location-based policy, namely the Empowerment Zones program. Using a remarkably
detailed series of data from the Census of Population, the Longitudinal Business database
and the Standard Statistical Establishment List, together with an identiﬁcation strategy
based on areas that applied for the credits but did not receive it, they are able to credi-
bly quantify the incidence and deadweight loss of the program. Consistent with the spatial
55Similarly, one can think of a direct subsidy to residents of poor areas. For example, the national
government could tax residents of areas with high (nominal) income to provide a transfer to residents of
areas with low (nominal) income. This type of redistribution has similar implications.
56Of course, an inﬁnitely elastic supply of housing would prevent this price increase.
57In some cases, these types of policies may even have perverse consequences for targeted localities. Since
the early 1970’s, the Canadian Unemployment Insurance program—a federal program—has been regionally
diﬀerentiated, with more generous beneﬁts in high unemployment areas. There is considerable evidence that
this feature has had signiﬁcant undesirable side eﬀects. See Kuhn and Riddell (2010), for example.
50equilibrium model outlined in Section 3, they ﬁnd that both wages and housing values in-
crease signiﬁcantly in the neighborhoods that beneﬁt from the federal subsidy relative to the
counterfactual neighborhoods in rejected zones. This increase is consistent with an upward
sloping local supply of labor.
In terms of incidence, Busso, Gregory and Kline (2009) ﬁnd that the program unam-
biguously beneﬁts landowners in Empowerment Zone areas. This increase in housing values
is not particularly surprising. Together with the failure to ﬁnd any changes in overall area
population, the increase in housing values indicates that the supply of housing is inelastic,
at least in the short run. More surprisingly, the program also beneﬁts workers who reside
in the area, since they experience an increase in nominal wages larger than the increase in
housing costs. Based on model in Section 3, this ﬁnding is consistent with the presence of
signiﬁcant locational preferences on the part of residents. Workers who live in the targeted
areas appear to have strong preferences for their current residence, so that their mobility is
limited. This is notable, because the treated areas are neighborhoods within much larger
metropolitan areas, and it is in principle possible to commute into the Empowerment Zone
areas from the rest of the metropolitan area without having to change residence. Given the
ﬁnding of small deadweight losses, the overall welfare assessment of the program appears
encouraging.
Busso, Gregory and Kline (2009) also ﬁnd that the provision of Empowerment Zone subsi-
dies results in an increase in the productivity of local ﬁrms. While it is diﬃcult to identify the
exact channel for this productivity increase, three plausible candidates are: an improvement
in public infrastructure or other local public goods; some form of agglomeration economy;
the role of the subsidies as a coordination mechanism for private investment. Because of
the nature of the subsidy and the type of production that is common in empowerment zone
areas, the most plausible candidate appears to be the last one.
(b) Locally Financed Subsidies. I consider now the case where local taxpayers bear
the cost of subsidizing ﬁrms that locate in their jurisdiction. The welfare eﬀects of this
type of policy depend on how similar the locations competing to attract new ﬁrms are. In
particular, in the case of homogenous locations, a locally ﬁnanced subsidy has no eﬀect on
residents’ welfare since all the rent associated with the subsidy is transferred to the ﬁrm. In
the case of heterogenous locations, a locally ﬁnanced subsidy will beneﬁt landowners by an
amount proportional to the diﬀerence in production cost between the location with the most
desirable attributes and the location with the second most desirable attributes. The eﬀect on
workers depends on the importance of their preferences for location. Limited preferences for
locations imply high mobility and therefore limited welfare changes. Signiﬁcant preferences
for locations imply low mobility and therefore signiﬁcant welfare changes for inframarginal
individuals.
To see this, I use the framework proposed by Greenstone and Moretti (2004). I assume
51that local governments bid to attract new ﬁrms to their jurisdiction by oﬀering subsidies, and
that the cost of the subsidy is ﬁnanced by increases in local property taxes, and therefore
is capitalized into land values. Let Vij denote the beneﬁt of the increase in the level of
economic activity generated by new ﬁrm j for locality i, assumed to be known to all the
other localities.58 Unlike in the case examined in the previous subsection—where the subsidy
was paid for by the central government—here a successful bid now involves a trade-oﬀ for
a locality. Let Cij denote the direct monetary cost of the subsidy. The partial equilibrium
change in welfare for the winning county can be expressed as Vij − Cij. Let the value to
ﬁrm j of locating in county i be Zij. Due to diﬀerences in technology, the same locality may
be more or less attractive to diﬀerent ﬁrms.59 A higher Zij implies that production costs of
ﬁrm j are lower in locality i. I assume that Z is known to all localities. The total value for a
ﬁrm of locating in a particular locality is the sum of the subsidy and the county-speciﬁc cost
advantages. A ﬁrm will select the locality where this sum, Bij +Zij, is maximized. In order
to obtain the highest subsidy, I assume that the ﬁrms conduct an English auction in the
presence of independent, or private, values. I further assume that there is not any collusion
in the bidding among counties.
Consider the case where counties are homogeneous in V and Z: Vij = V0 and Zij = Z0
for all i. In this case, the ﬁrm simply chooses the location that oﬀers the highest subsidy,
B. The equilibrium bid, B*, is B∗ = V0. This implies that successfully attracting the ﬁrm
does not change residents’ welfare: V0 − B∗ = 0. The reason is that each jurisdiction keeps
raising its bids until it is indiﬀerent between winning and losing, so that the equilibrium bid
is such that the entire economic rent is transferred to the ﬁrm. In this case landowners are
indiﬀerent, since the beneﬁt of the new ﬁrm is fully oﬀset by the increase in property taxes.
This result is similar to the result in the tax competition literature where local jurisdictions
keep taxes on capital low because of a fear of capital ﬂight.
Consider now the more general case where counties’ valuations of attracting the plant
and plants’ valuations of counties are heterogenous. Assume for simplicity that there are
only two locations, high V (VH) and low V (VL); and two levels of Z, high Z (ZH) and low Z,
(ZL). If V and Z are positively correlated, the location with high V also has high Z. In this
case, this location gains the most from attracting ﬁrm j and it is also the most attractive to
ﬁrm j. The optimal bid is such that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between moving to either city.
Unlike the homogenous case, where all the economic rent is bid away, in this case, the H
58This is equal to the change in utility for local residents and landowners. If labor is mobile, workers are
always indiﬀerent, and landowners are the only set of agents whose welfare may be aﬀected. If workers have
preferences for location, however, both workers and landowners are aﬀected. While this type of subsidy is
quite common in practice, it is not always obvious what localities seek to maximize in this process. One
possibility is that, in the presence of unemployment, localities seek to maximize job creation. My theoretical
model in Section 3 is a full employment model that by construction rules out unemployment.
59For example, the presence of a harbor, an airport or a freeway may be more important for some produc-
tions than others. Similarly, the presence of stringent environmental or labor regulations may aﬀect some
ﬁrms more than others.
52county enjoys an economic rent that comes from the fact that it has characteristics that are
desirable to the ﬁrm.
If labor is highly mobile, and housing is inelastically supplied, this economic rent will be
capitalized into land values. In particular, land values increase by an amount (VH − VL) +
(ZH−ZL) > 0, proportional to the diﬀerence in V and the diﬀerence in Z. The same intuition
applies to the case where V and Z are negatively correlated, and location 1 has high V and
low Z, while location 2 has high Z and low V. If VH + ZL > VL + ZH, location 1 wins the
ﬁrm by bidding an amount B∗ that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent: B∗ = VL + (ZH − ZL). As
in the case of positive correlation between Z and V, the winning location enjoys a rent that
is capitalized in land values, although the rent is lower than the rent in the case of positive
correlation: (VH −VL)−(ZH −ZL) > 0. A similar conclusion applies if VH +ZL < VL +ZH.
In this case location 2 is the winner and its land prices increase by (ZH−ZL)−(VH−VL) > 0.
5.1.2 Taxes and Transfers Based on Nominal Income
An important redistributive implication of the spatial equilibrium model has to do with
federal taxation and federal transfers. Federal taxes and transfers are calculated based
on nominal income. By setting taxes and federal transfers in nominal terms, the federal
government engages in a hidden form of location-based redistribution, because workers with
the same real income pay higher federal taxes in high-cost areas than in low-cost areas.
Albouy (2009) estimates that workers in cities where nominal wages are above the national
average pay up to 27% more in federal taxes than similar workers in cities where nominal
wages are below the national average. As a consequence, $270 billion each year are transferred
from areas with high nominal wages to areas with low nominal wages.
In equilibrium, if workers are mobile, wages and land prices should adjust to compensate
workers. However, the resulting geographic distribution of employment is ineﬃcient, since
it penalizes highly productive cities and favors less productive cities. In other words, this
policy artiﬁcially lowers economic activity and property values in cities where labor is more
productive and nominal wages are higher. At the same time it increases economic activity
and property values in cities where labor is less productive and nominal wages are lower. The
net result is a loss in overall welfare. Albouy calculates that the long-run employment loss
in high nominal wage areas is about 13 %, while the loss in land and housing values is about
21% and 5%, respectively. Albouy suggests that one solution is to make taxes independent
of where workers live so that they are eﬀectively lump sum location-wise.
A related problem arises when thinking about transfer payments. Should they be based
on nominal or real income? Using a spatial equilibrium model similar to the one in Section
3, Glaeser (1998) derives the conditions under which welfare payments should be adjusted
for diﬀerences in the local cost of living. He concludes that the optimal transfer depends on
mobility and preferences for amenities. In the case of perfect mobility, transfer payments
that correct for diﬀerences in the local cost of living are ineﬃcient, because they end up being
53capitalized in the price of land, further raising land costs in expensive areas. With limited
mobility, a correction for local cost of living diﬀerences is optimal under the assumption that
amenities and income are complements.
5.1.3 Nominal and Real Diﬀerences Across Skill Groups and Regions
The spatial equilibrium model has implications for how one should measure earnings and
income diﬀerences between skill groups or between regions. In most countries, there are
large cost of living diﬀerences across regions. These diﬀerences are typically largely driven
by diﬀerences in the price of land. When comparing earnings or income across skill groups or
across regions, the question arises of whether nominal measures should be used or whether
real measures should be used. This question matters because the magnitude of income
diﬀerences between skill groups or between regions has implications for the desirability of
redistributive policies.
Earnings Diﬀerences Between Skill Groups. Consider the increase in earnings
inequality in the US labor market in the past three decades. As documented by a large
literature in labor economics, starting in 1980 the nominal earnings of skilled workers have
grown signiﬁcantly faster than the nominal earnings of unskilled workers. In the same period,
there have been increasing diﬀerences in the geographic distribution of skilled and unskilled
workers. Skilled workers have increasingly concentrated in cities with high costs of land,
while unskilled workers have increasingly concentrated in cities with low costs of land. This
geographic sorting suggests that skilled workers might have experienced higher increases in
the cost of living.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Moretti (2010) ﬁnds that earnings inequality measured
in real terms has grown signiﬁcantly less than earnings inequality in nominal terms. The
model in Section 3 shows that the implications for utility inequality depend on the underlying
reasons for the geographic sorting. If the sorting of skilled workers into more expensive cities
is driven by increases in the relative demand of skilled labor in those cities, the increase
in relative utility of skilled workers is smaller than the increase in their nominal wage.
On the other hand, if the sorting of college graduates into more expensive cities is driven
by an increase in the relative supply for skilled labor in those cities (i.e. an increase in
the attraction of local amenities), increases in the cost of living in these cities reﬂect the
increased attractiveness of the cities for skilled workers. In this case, there may still be a
signiﬁcant increase in utility inequality even if the increase in real wage inequality is limited.
Moretti (2010) argues that the evidence is more consistent with the notion that shifts in the
relative demand for skilled labor are the main force driving changes in the number of skilled
workers across metropolitan areas and that the increase in well-being inequality is smaller
than the increase in nominal wage inequality. These results are related to a paper by Black
et al. (2007) which, along with earlier work by Dahl (2002), criticizes the standard practice
54of treating the returns to education as uniform across locations. They show that, in theory,
the return to schooling is constant across locations only in the special case of homothetic
preferences, and argue that the returns to education are empirically lower in high-amenity
locations.60
Regional Diﬀerences in Income and Poverty. A related question arises when mea-
suring earnings or income diﬀerences across locations. Using data for ﬁve US regions, Slesnick
(2002) shows that regional comparisons of poverty rates based on nominal ﬁgures give a dif-
ferent picture than regional comparisons of poverty rates based on real ﬁgures. Consistent
with the spatial equilibrium model, Slesnick shows that disparities in real income across
regions are smaller when cost of living diﬀerentials are accounted for, so that the prevalence
of poverty across regions changes signiﬁcantly. For example, rural areas and Southern states
have a relatively low cost of living. As a consequence, poverty rates for rural areas and for
many urban areas in the South are signiﬁcantly closer to the rest of the country when real
income is used instead of nominal income.
While this evidence is a useful ﬁrst step, it is likely that an analysis at the regional
level misses important intra-regional variation in the cost of living. A geographically more
detailed analysis based on city-level data may uncover an even stronger eﬀect of cost of living
diﬀerences on the geographic distribution of poverty rates.
5.1.4 Subsidies to Human Capital when Labor is Mobile
In the spatial equilibrium model, workers’ mobility determines the incidence of location-
based government policies through their eﬀects on land prices. Areas that beneﬁt from
government transfers experience an increase in the price of land that oﬀsets (at least in part)
the beneﬁt of the transfer. However, in reality, workers’ mobility may aﬀect the incidence
of location-based government policies even in the absence of local price changes. A salient
example is the case of subsidies to human capital accumulation. Localized human capital
externalities of the type discussed in Section 4.2.3 represent an important eﬃciency rationale
for the provision of public subsidies to investment in human capital. However, in the presence
of signiﬁcant worker mobility it is not clear who ultimately beneﬁts from these subsidies.
Consider for example the case of subsidies to higher education. State and local government
cover a larger fraction of higher education expenditures.61 Yet, the high mobility of educated
workers across states implies that part of the investment in human capital made by one state
60In a related paper, Black et al. (2009) argue that estimates of the wage diﬀerences between blacks
and whites need to account for diﬀerences in the geographic location of diﬀerent racial groups. They argue
that accounting for geography changes the estimates of the speed of convergence between black and white
earnings. They also develop a theoretical model to understand when estimates of the black-white earnings
gap can be used to infer welfare diﬀerences.
61For example, the current subsidy of direct costs to students at major public universities in the U.S. is
around 80%.
55may beneﬁt other states. Bound, Groen, Kezdi and Turner (2004) quantify the magnitude
of this problem by relating the production of new college graduates in a state to the stock
of college-educated workers in the state. They ﬁnd that the elasticity of stocks to ﬂows is
approximately 0.3 for BA’s. This elasticity is even lower for students with medical degrees.
This implies a high degree of migration. In a simple static model of where the supply and
demand for college graduates determine the stock of college graduates, increases in the stock
of college graduates due to increases in supply should lead to lower relative wages for college
graduates, whereas increases in the stock due to increased demand should result in higher
wages. The empirical results in Bound, Groen, Kezdi and Turner (2004) are consistent with
the prediction that inelastic local demand causes the eﬀect of ﬂows on stocks to be smaller.
Additionally, a regression of relative wages on relative stocks indicates that the elasticity
of wages to stocks is negative, consistent with some areas exporting college graduates and
others importing them. Using more recent data, Bartik (2009) ﬁnds lower mobility rates
of skilled workers and therefore concludes that state investment in higher education is not
completely dissipated by labor mobility.
5.2 Eﬃciency Considerations
The previous subsection concluded that the equity rationale for public transfers that
target locations instead of individuals is generally not very compelling. A second possible
rationale for government intervention has to do with eﬃciency. The key question in this
respect is: are there market failures that suggest that governments should use taxpayer
money to provide eﬃciency enhancing subsidies to ﬁrms to locate in their jurisdiction? In
the absence of signiﬁcant market failures, it is diﬃcult to justify the use of taxpayer money
for subsidies based on eﬃciency grounds. Here I consider four possible market failures.
5.2.1 Internalizing Agglomeration Spillovers
Local economic development policies are carried out both by local governments and
by national governments.62 To draw normative implications, it is therefore important to
distinguish the point of view of a locality—which maximizes its own local welfare without
consideration for aggregate welfare—from the point of view of the central government, which
maximizes aggregate welfare.
Local Welfare. From the point of view of a local government, the most important
eﬃciency rationale for location-based incentives is the existence of signiﬁcant agglomeration
externalities. This rationale hinges on whether the attraction of new businesses generates
some form of external beneﬁts to other ﬁrms in the same locality. If the attraction of
62In the case of the European Union, some location-based policies are ﬁnanced by the Union itself, which
is an international government.
56new business generates localized positive agglomeration externalities, then the provision of
subsidies may be able to generate the eﬃcient allocation of resources in the local economy.63
In a static setting, the optimal magnitude of these incentives depends on the magnitude
of agglomerations externalities. The literature described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 suggests
that these externalities may be important empirically, although there is still debate on their
exact magnitude and the mechanisms that generate them.
In a dynamic setting, the existence of signiﬁcant agglomeration economies has the po-
tential to generate multiple equilibria. Kline (2010) proposes a simple theoretical framework
that is useful in thinking about the magnitude of the eﬃcient subsidy in the presence of mul-
tiple equilibria. In this case, the magnitude of the optimal subsidy is more complicated to
derive, because it depends on the exact shape of Marshallian dynamics. Consider for exam-
ple the case where the productivity of ﬁrms in a locality is a function of the number of other
similar ﬁrms in that locality so that attracting new ﬁrms to a locality raises the productivity
of all the ﬁrms in that locality (as in Greestone, Hornbeck, and Moretti, forthcoming). If the
magnitude of this agglomeration externality is large enough, it is possible that the demand
for labor is locally upward sloping, since more ﬁrms in a locality imply both more workers
and higher productivity (as in equation 41 above). As discussed in Section 3.3, this setting
is inherently characterized by multiple equilibria, with some equilibria featuring low levels
of economic activity, low productivity and low nominal wages and other equilibria featuring
high levels of economic activity, high productivity and high nominal wages. The size of the
eﬃcient subsidy can vary enormously, depending on the exact functional form of Marshallian
dynamics, and on the starting point. On the one hand, if a locality is located at an unstable
tipping point, a very limited subsidy can be enough to move it to a new equilibrium with
an higher level of economic activity and agglomeration. On the other hand, if a locality is
trapped in a stable bad equilibrium, ”Big Push” type of policies may be needed to move it
to a good equilibrium (Kline, 2010).
In this context, government intervention in the form of subsidies for ﬁrms to locate in the
jurisdiction has the potential to start an agglomeration process that can ultimately shift a
locality from a bad equilibrium (small agglomeration, low productivity) to a good equilibrium
(large agglomeration, high productivity). The provision of a subsidy can have substantial
and long lasting eﬀects on the equilibrium level of economic activity in a locality.64 Indeed,
63An additional, although arguably less important, rationale that has been proposed for subsidies to
attract new ﬁrms—and especially headquarters—has to do with charitable contributions. Card, Hallock and
Moretti (2009) document that attracting the headquarters of a publicly traded ﬁrm yields $3-10 million per
year in contributions to local non-proﬁts. Most of the increase in charitable contributions appears to be
linked to the number of highly-compensated individuals in a city, rather than through direct donations by
the corporations themselves. From a normative point of view, this rationale is not unassailable. Given the
magnitude of the subsidies often required to attract headquarters, if this was the only beneﬁt of attracting
headquarters, there is no reason why the municipality should not have provided subsidies directly to the
non-proﬁt sector.
64Of course, the process of agglomeration in this case would continue up to the point where the productivity
57the expectation of government intervention alone may play a role in shifting a locality from
a bad to a good equilibrium. In this case, the government policy acts as a coordination
mechanism that signals to workers and ﬁrms which locality among all existing localities
will move to a good equilibrium in the future. If ﬁrms and workers take this signal as
credible, they will move to that jurisdiction, eﬀectively realizing the expected outcome. In
practice, it is implausible to expect that announcements alone are eﬀective enough to have
substantial real-world eﬀects on the localization of economic activity. But it is plausible
to think that in the presence of multiple equilibria, expectations together with the actual
provision of subsidies might play a non-trivial role in the localization of ﬁrms and workers
across locations.
In the presence of multiple equilibria, the eﬃciency beneﬁts for location-based policies
have the potential to be quite large relative to the eﬃciency costs. Consider the case where
the provision of location based subsidies attracts new businesses to a location and move the
locality from a bad equilibrium (low density of economic activity) to a good equilibrium
(high density of economic activity). In this case the short-run eﬃciency costs of providing
location-based subsidies could be small compared to the potential long-run beneﬁts of moving
to a better equilibrium.
Aggregate Welfare. The eﬃciency argument, however, has diﬀerent implications if one
takes the point of view of the national government instead of the local government. For the
point of view of a national government, the main concern is that the provision of subsidies
by local governments may result in a zero-sum game, where the jobs created in targeted
areas come at the expense of jobs elsewhere. In this context, justifying such policies requires
a rationale for moving jobs from one location to another. In their comprehensive overview
of the issue, Glaeser and Gottleib (2008) argue that the only such rationale is for local
agglomeration economies to be stronger on the margin in targeted areas. In other words,
aggregate eﬃciency would require subsidies to favor areas that are more productive and
where the elasticity of productivity with respect to agglomeration is higher. To achieve this
eﬃcient allocation, policy makers need to know the exact functional form of the spillover
function. In practice, this functional form is still largely unknown, because it is diﬃcult
to estimate credibly. Given the diﬃculty of identifying the magnitude of agglomeration
economies under a linearity assumption, it is not surprising that we still do not have a good
idea of possible nonlinearities. Because of this diﬃculty, Glaeser and Gottleib conclude that
policy-makers still do not have enough information to implement location-based policies that
are eﬃcient from the aggregate point of view.
However, when the beneﬁts of attracting a new ﬁrm are highly heterogeneous, it is in
principle possible that competition among localities may result in aggregate eﬃciency gains.
Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2008) document one example of signiﬁcant heterogeneity
in productivity spillovers. Using the methodology described in Section 4.1, they present
advantages of agglomeration are oﬀset by the increase in land prices (Section 3.3.)
58location-speciﬁc estimates of the impact on TFP of incumbent plants of new plant openings.
Their Figure 2 reveals that there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated spillover.
Importantly, the magnitude of the productivity spillover does not appear to be random,
but it varies systematically with easisly observable features of the new plant. In particular,
Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti document that the productivity spillover generated by
the opening of a new large manufacturing plant is larger for incumbent plants that share
similar labor and technology pools with the new plant.65 It appears plausible in this case that
policy makers are able to evaluate the potential value to their locality of attracting the new
plant because this value depends on the degree of proximity of the local labor and technology
pools to those of the new plant. This type of heterogeneity is important because it allows for
the possibility of aggregate eﬃciency gains. National welfare is maximized when payments
are made to plants that produce the spillovers so that they internalize this externality in
making their location decision. In this case the locality that has the most to gain is the
one that successfully attracts the new plant. The decentralized equilibrium in the presence
of signiﬁcant heterogeneity in productivity spillovers together with the assumption that
the potential value of attracting the new plant is known to each locality is not necessarily
inconsistent with aggregate eﬃciency. From the equity point of view, the discussion of a
locally ﬁnanced subsidy in Section 5.1.1 suggests that in this case some but not all of the
economic rent generated by the spillover ends up being transferred to the new ﬁrm. In
particular, the locality that has the most to gain should only capture the fraction of the
overall beneﬁt that reﬂects the diﬀerence in production costs between the location with the
most desirable attributes and the location with the second most desirable attributes.
5.2.2 Unemployment, Missing Insurance and Credit Constraints
Besides the existence of agglomeration externalities, there are three additional market
failures that can in principle justify location-based policies.
First, wages may not be fully responsive to local shocks. Consider the case of idiosyncratic
shocks to localities, where some cities or states are hit by negative demand shocks while other
are not. The theoretical model in Section 3 is a full employment model, where wages always
adjust fully to local shocks. The model indicates that if workers are mobile, and wages fully
adjust, counter-cyclical transfers to localities hit by negative shocks will only have a limited
eﬀect on workers’ welfare. However, the model eﬀectively assumes away unemployment. In
reality, wages may not be fully responsive to local labor market conditions, at least in the
short run. If wages are not fully responsive, negative demand shocks will cause socially
costly involuntary unemployment. In this case, countercyclical transfers from the central
65By contrast, using a diﬀerent methodology Glaeser and Gottleib (2008) ﬁnd little evidence that agglom-
eration economies vary systematically based on the easily observable characteristics of metropolitan areas.
For example, they ﬁnd that agglomeration economies do not appear to depend on city size or on urban
amenities.
59government have the potential to improve aggregate welfare. Of course, this potential welfare
gain should be weighed against the distortionary cost of government intervention.
Second, even with full employment, homeowners are exposed to localized demand shocks,
and there is no market-provided insurance to insure against such shocks. As explained in
Section 3, shocks to a local economy aﬀect the residents’ value of housing, unless the elasticity
of housing supply is inﬁnite. Since housing is the most important asset for most households,
the amount of risk generated by these shocks can be large. Existing ﬁnancial instruments
make it diﬃcult to diversify housing risk. In this context, redistributive countercyclical
policies that are centrally ﬁnanced and target localities hit by negative idiosyncratic shocks
may in principle act as government-provided insurance against housing value risk that the
market does not insure. This policy eﬀectively acts as a redistributive mechanism that
transfers resources from homeowners in areas aﬀected by positive shocks to homeowners in
areas aﬀected by negative shocks thus reducing risk.
However, it is not clear that in practice these policies improve eﬃciency. First, there
is the general deadweight loss of government intervention. Second, and more importantly,
homeowners and workers often coincide. An optimal insurance scheme should therefore take
into account both housing risk and wage risk. This is very diﬃcult to do in practice because
the correlation between housing values and wages is complicated. For example, the model
with heterogenous labor in Section 3 has shown that if workers have idiosyncratic preferences
for location, the eﬀect of a localized shock on a worker’s welfare depends on that worker’s skill
level and location. If labor and housing supply elasticities are less then inﬁnite, inframarginal
skilled workers in the locality that receives a positive skill-biased productivity shock (city b)
experience an increase in utility, while inframarginal unskilled workers experience a decrease.
Inframarginal workers in city a, the city not directly aﬀected by the shock, experience an
increase in utility, irrespective of their skill level. In other words, in the example of the
model, wages and housing values are negatively correlated for unskilled workers and for
skilled workers in city a, but positively correlated for skilled workers in city b. This makes
an eﬃcient location-based insurance policy diﬃcult to implement in practice.
Finally, the private and social costs of mobility might not be the same. When workers
are mobile, and the private cost of mobility and the social cost of mobility are identical,
the spatial adjustment that follows a negative shock to an area may be eﬃcient. However,
as pointed out by Blanchard and Katz (1992), credit constraints may introduce a wedge
between the private and social costs of mobility. For example, following a negative shock
to an area, workers without access to credit may be forced to leave even when it is optimal
for them to borrow and wait for the equilibrium to be reestablished. This would lead to a
socially ineﬃcient degree of adjustment through mobility and may provide justiﬁcation for
eﬃciency-enhancing government intervention.
606 Conclusions
Understanding local labor markets is important for labor economists. The last three
decades have witnessed a growing amount of empirical research on the causes and conse-
quences of localization of workers and ﬁrms within a country. This area, at the intersection
of labor and urban economics, contains important but challenging questions and is likely to
generate an increasing share of high quality empirical research in the next decade.
Besides the obvious relevance for labor economists directly working on these topics,
the idea of spatial equilibrium discussed in this chapter has a broader relevance for labor
economists in general. It is diﬃcult to understand the eﬀect of nationwide labor demand
changes on wages and employment without considering the role played by the spatial reallo-
cation of labor and general equilibrium eﬀects on local prices. Labor ﬂows across localities
and changes in local prices have the potential to undo some of the direct eﬀects of labor
market shocks.
The spatial equilibrium model presented in this chapter is a useful tool to think about
the incidence of demand shocks when general equilibrium feedbacks are important. The
version of the model that I propose in Section 3 is kept deliberately simple, so that all the
equilibrium outcomes have transparent, closed-form solutions. Moreover, it is scalable, in
the sense that it is relatively easy to relax some of the assumptions, in order to adapt it to
particular circumstances. The hope is that other researchers may ﬁnd the framework useful
in future work.
The survey of the empirical literature in Section 4 points to a growing body of solid
empirical evidence on the existence of signiﬁcant agglomeration economies. Although the
econometric challenges—identiﬁcation in particular—have proven in many cases diﬃcult to
fully overcome, there appears to be general agreement that agglomeration economies at the
city level are empirically signiﬁcant for many industries. While there is still debate on the
exact economic magnitude of these externalities, many studies point to externalities of an
economically non-trivial magnitude.
The last decade has also witnessed increasing eﬀorts by researchers to pinpoint the pre-
cise mechanisms that might generate agglomeration economies. This is crucial to obtaining
a convincing picture of the agglomeration phenomenon. Without understanding the precise
mechanisms that generate agglomeration economies it is diﬃcult to be conﬁdent about the
existence of these externalities and to draw deﬁnitive conclusions for local development poli-
cies. Moreover, the three leading explanations imply diﬀerent types of market failures and
therefore call for diﬀerent type of policy responses. While the literature has produced a num-
ber of insightful empirical studies on the three possible mechanisms, overall the literature has
not been completely successful in distinguishing between their relative importance. I share
the view expressed by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2010) in a recent survey of this literature, when
they conclude that “the ﬁeld has still not reached a consensus on the relative importance
of diﬀerent sources of agglomeration economies”. Given the important policy implications,
61more work is clearly needed on this topic.
Understanding the causes and the consequences of agglomeration of economic activity is
crucial to understanding the economic rationale for location-based policies and their welfare
consequences. These policies are widespread, but their economic rationales are not always
clear. The discussion in Section 5 indicates that in a world where workers are mobile,
targeting locations instead of individuals is an ineﬀective means of helping disadvantaged
individuals. In a world with signiﬁcant agglomeration spillovers, government intervention
may be eﬃcient from the point of view of a locality, although not always from the point of
view of aggregate welfare.
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Metropolitan Areas with the Highest Wage
Stamford, CT 20.21
San Jose, CA 19.70
Danbury, CT 19.13
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 18.97
New York-Northeastern NJ 18.86
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 18.30
Santa Cruz, CA 18.24
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 18.23
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 17.72
Seattle-Everett, WA 17.71







El Paso, TX 11.96
Abilene, TX 11.87
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 11.23
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, TX 10.65
Notes: The sample includes all full-time US born workers between the age of 25 and 60 with
a high school degree who worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year. Data are from the
2000 Census of Population.








San Jose, CA 38.49
New York-Northeastern NJ 36.03
Trenton, NJ 35.52
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 34.89
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 33.70
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 33.37
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 33.07
Metropolitan Areas with the Lowest Wage
Pueblo, CO 20.16
Goldsboro, NC 20.15
St. Joseph, MO 20.01




Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 18.99
Altoona, PA 18.68
Jacksonville, NC 18.21
Notes: The sample includes all full-time US born workers between the age of 25 and 60 with
a college degree who worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year. Data are from the 2000
Census of Population.
70Table 3: Average Hourly Wage in 1980 and 2000, by Education Level and Metropolitan
Area.
High School Graduates
Low Wage High Wage
in 2000 in 2000
Low Wage in 1980 106 40
High Wage in 1980 34 108
College Graduates
Low Wage High Wage
in 2000 in 2000
Low Wage in 1980 114 32
High Wage in 1980 26 116
Notes: For each skill group, metropolitan areas are classiﬁed as having a low or high wage
depending on whether their average wage is below or above the average wage of the median
metropolitan area in the relevant year. The sample includes all full-time US born workers
between the age of 25 and 60 who worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year. Data are
from the 2000 Census of Population. There are 288 metropolitan areas.
71Figure 1: Change Over Time in the Average Hourly Nominal Wage of High School Graduates











































Wage of High School Graduates in 1980









































Wage of College Graduates in 1980






Notes: Each panel plots the average nominal wage in 1980 against the average nominal wage
in 2000, by metropolitan area. The top panel is for high school graduates. The bottom panel
is for college graduates. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of workers in
the relevant metropolitan area and skill group 1980. There are 288 metropolitan areas. The
line is the predicted wage in 2000 from a weighted OLS regression, where the weights are
the number of workers in the relevant metropolitan area and skill group in 1980. The slope
is 1.82 (0.89) for high school graduates and 3.54 (.11) for college graduates. Data are from
the Census of Population. The sample includes all full-time US born workers between the
age of 25 and 60 who worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year.
72Figure 2: Distribution of Average Hourly Real Wage of High School Graduates and College
Graduates, by Metropolitan Area
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Notes: This ﬁgure reports the distribution of average hourly real wage of high school gradu-
ates and college graduates across metropolitan areas in the 2000 Census of Population. Real
wage is deﬁned as the ratio of nominal wage and a cost of living index that reﬂects diﬀerences
across metropolitan areas in the cost of housing. The index is normalized so that it has a
mean of 1. There are 288 metropolitan areas. The sample includes all full-time US born
workers between the age of 25 and 60 who worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year.










Notes: This ﬁgure reports the distribution of average total factor productivity of manu-
facturing establishments in 1992, by county. County-level TFP estimates are obtained from
estimates of establishment level production functions based on data from the Census of Man-
ufacturers. Speciﬁcally, they are obtained from a regression of log output on hours worked
by blue and white collar workers, book value of building capital, book value of machinery
capital, materials, industry and county ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁgure shows the distribution of the
coeﬃcients on the county dummies. Regressions are weighted by plant output. The sample
is restricted to counties that had 10 or more plants in either 1977 or 1992 in the 2xxx or 3xxx
SIC codes. There are 2126 counties that satisfy the sample restriction. For conﬁdentiality
reasons, any data from counties whose output was too concentrated in a small number of
plants are not in the ﬁgure (although they are included in the regression).
















         





Notes: The ﬁgure plots county-level average TFP in 1977 on the x-axis against TFP in 1992
on the y-axis. County-level TFP estimates are obtained from estimates of establishment
level production functions based on data from the Census of Manufacturers. Speciﬁcally,
they are obtained from a regression of log output on hours worked, book value of building
capital, book value of machinery capital, materials, industry and county ﬁxed eﬀects. Each
regression is estimated separately for 1977 and 1992. The ﬁgure shows the coeﬃcients on
the county dummies in each year. Regressions are weighted by plant output. The sample is
restricted to counties that had 10 or more plants in either 1977 or 1992 in the 2xxx or 3xxx
SIC codes. There are 2126 counties that satisfy the sample restriction. For conﬁdentiality
reasons, any data from counties whose output was too concentrated in a small number of
plants are not in the ﬁgure (although they are included in the regression).
75Figure 5: Distribution in the Number of Patents Filed by City
 
 
Number of Patents in 2000
 




Notes: The ﬁgure reports the distribution of the average yearly number of patents ﬁled
between 1998 and 2002 across cities. I use the average over 5 years to reduce small sample
noise. The level of observation is the city, as reported in the patent ﬁle. This deﬁnition of
city does not correspond to the deﬁnition of metropolitan statistical area.
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Notes: The x-axis is the average yearly number of patents ﬁled between 1978 and 1982.
The y-axis is the average yearly number of patents ﬁled between 1998 and 2002. I use the
averages over 5 years to reduce sample noise. The level of observation is the city, as reported
in the patent ﬁle. This deﬁnition of city does not correspond to metropolitan statistical area.
For visual clarity, the ﬁgure excludes 3 cities that have more than 2000 patents per year. A
regression based on the full sample (i.e. including the cities with more than 3000 patents
per year) yields a coeﬃcient (std error) equal to 1.009 (.0311). The ﬁtted line in the ﬁgure is
based on the full sample (i.e. including the 3 cities with more than 2000 patents per year).
77Figure 7: Productivity of Incumbent Plants in Counties with a New Plant Opening and
Counterfactual Counties, Relative to the Year of Plant Opening
Notes: This ﬁgure reproduces Figure 1 in Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (forthcoming).
The solid line in the top panel shows average total factor productivity of incumbent plants in
counties that successfully attract a new manufacturing plant. In Greenstone, Hornbeck and
Moretti these are called winner counties. t=0 represent the year of the new plant opening.
The dotted line in the top panel shows average total factor productivity of incumbent plants
in counties that bid for the new plant, make it into the group of ﬁnalists but ultimately fail to
attract the new plant. In Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti these are called loser counties.
The bottom panel shows the diﬀerence in average total factor productivity of incumbent
plants between winner counties and loser counties. 78